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COMPUTERS AS CASTLES:  PREVENTING THE 
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE FROM BECOMING A 
VEHICLE FOR OVERBROAD DIGITAL SEARCHES 
James Saylor*
 
 
The plain view doctrine is based on the practical logic that an officer 
need not turn a blind eye to evidence that is immediately apparent as 
incriminating when he is lawfully present, where the object can be seen, 
and where he has a legal right to access that object.  However, in the 
context of digital searches, this basic logic is stretched to a point that 
directly conflicts with the original purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  The 
immense amount of data present on computers makes these searches much 
more intrusive.  Officers employ search methods and techniques to access 
files that involve more investigation than the plain view doctrine ever 
intended.  The problems presented by new technology to placing reasonable 
limits on the scope of otherwise valid Fourth Amendment searches have 
caused many courts to defer to traditional methods of analysis, rather than 
prompting courts to devise a new approach that could better reflect the 
realities of how police conduct these searches.  Certain courts—which this 
Note designates “traditionalist”—find no reason to change what is a 
physical doctrine in the digital context, but rather allow it to progress 
incrementally. 
This Note argues that courts have made no progress towards 
appropriately defining reasonableness in the context of digital searches, 
and that they should be imposing a heightened particularity standard for 
digital warrants, as well as additional prophylactic steps, as the U.S. 
Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and (to a lesser extent) Tenth Circuits have 
suggested. The traditionalist interpretation encouraged law enforcement 
authorities and training manuals to take advantage of this lax position, and 
plead general concerns common to all computer cases to justify broad 
search warrants.  Moreover, the same general concerns that convince 
magistrates to draw such general warrants lead district court judges to 
defer to an investigator’s discretion.  To remain consistent with the original 
spirit of the Fourth Amendment, as a bar against unfettered police 
discretion and arbitrary governmental action, courts must adopt a new 
approach. 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law.  The author would like to thank 
his family and friends for their support during the production of this Note.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The police are executing a warrant on the home of a suspect accused of a 
minor crime.  To prevent against indiscriminate rummaging by law 
enforcement, the warrant must lay out with particularity the area to be 
searched and the items to be seized.  However, the warrant in this case is 
not for your average home.  This particular suspect has all of his family’s 
personal information, financial statements, medical information, and other 
effects strewn about the premises.  Tax records are used as wallpaper, 
family photo albums form end tables in the living room, all personal 
correspondences are taped to the refrigerator, and so on.  The intrusiveness 
of what would otherwise be a normal search, governed by normal Fourth 
Amendment principles, has been exacerbated by this wealth of information 
now available to an ambitious law enforcement officer.  In executing this 
simple warrant, the officer justifies a dragnet search in which he is free to 
search and seize any portion of this wealth of data on the theory that it was 
all in “plain view.” 
This absurd example illustrates the difficulties courts face when they 
evaluate the appropriate limits of the “plain view” exception to the Fourth 
Amendment in the context of digital searches.  When executing a warrant, 
the government may lawfully seize evidence of other crimes found in “plain 
view.”1  Like most exceptions to the warrant requirement, the plain view 
exception originally encapsulated practicality concerns, yet its scope has 
expanded as courts have become willing to find such exceptions present in 
changed circumstances.2  The original justifications for the plain view 
doctrine are not present in digital searches,3
 
 1. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 130 (1990). 
 and its wholesale adoption has 
 2. See ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS:  A REFERENCE GUIDE 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 102 (2003). 
 3. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326–27 (1987) (describing the initial 
justification for the plain view exception in digital searches). 
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led to an impermissible dilution of the probable cause and particularity 
standard,4 as well as the exclusionary rule.5  Courts too easily analogize 
digital and physical searches, failing to see the plain view doctrine as 
essentially grounded in practicality concerns only present in physical 
environments—carefully delineated situations where it would be 
nonsensical to force an officer to ignore evidence that he stumbled upon in 
the course of an otherwise lawful physical search.6
Previously unforeseen circumstances introduced by new technology have 
made it more difficult to employ this reasoning, which was established in 
the context of physical searches.  Hard drives have replaced filing cabinets, 
comprehensive financial and medical records are stored in massive 
databases, and some of our most personal information, including pictures of 
loved ones and personal correspondences, are stored in the almost endless 
space that exists on a modern personal computer.
 
7  The existence of all this 
information is compounded by the rise of data transmission over the 
Internet and the availability of access to thousands of employee files on 
businesses’ shared databases.8  Electronic storage contains much more 
information, both in terms of quantity and variety, which makes it a 
tempting target in a search for incriminating information.9  Computers do 
not only hold information voluntarily stored.  Unbeknownst to many users, 
they also “record and store a remarkable amount of information about what 
users write, see, hear, and do.”10  Because of this, analogizing electronically 
stored information to physical objects for the purposes of establishing 
constitutional limits, is an “oversimplif[ication that] ignores the realities of 
massive modern computer storage.”11
The methods law enforcement employ to search computers afford them 
broad discretion to sift through these massive databases.
 
12
 
 4. The particularity requirement is contained in the text of the Fourth Amendment and 
requires that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV. 
  Warrants for 
 5. The exclusionary rule states that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment cannot be admitted at trial.  This rule was first applied to the federal 
government in the case of Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).  It was not until 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) that the Court applied it to the states via the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 660.  For a more thorough discussion of the 
exclusionary rule, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.1 (4th ed. 2004). 
 6. See infra Part I.D. 
 7. United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007) (stating that for the 
average user, computers are “postal services, playgrounds, jukeboxes, dating services, movie 
theaters, daily planners, shopping malls, personal secretaries, virtual diaries, and more” 
(quoting Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 
569 (2005))). 
 8. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, Nos. 97-192, 1999 WL 823741, at *34 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 
Aug. 18, 1999). 
 9. Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and Computer Data, 8 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 75, 104–05 (1994). 
 10. Kerr, supra note 7, at 532. 
 11. Winick, supra note 9, at 110. 
 12. See infra Part II. 
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electronic files grant a license to investigating officers to conduct a general 
search while relying on the plain view exception to cover any evidence of 
crimes not contained in the warrant.  The U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
the plain view exception “may not be used to extend a general exploratory 
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last 
emerges.”13  The Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment in the wake of the 
British colonial government’s abuse of general warrants and writs of 
assistance that afforded investigating officers unfettered discretion in 
searching persons and places.14  The spirit of their rejection of these tactics 
has continued to inform courts when evaluating Fourth Amendment 
issues.15
Circuit courts have disagreed on the appropriate standard.  The United 
States Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits—a 
group this Note labels “traditionalist”—have not changed the doctrine in 
these new circumstances, and prefer to allow it to progress incrementally.
  With this history in mind, what should courts find to be “plain 
view” in the context of computer searches? 
16  
In contrast, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,17 and to a lesser 
degree the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit18
 
 13. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). 
—a group this Note 
designates “restrictive”—have suggested a high particularity standard in 
warrants for digital evidence, including search protocols and other 
 14. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 15. See infra Part I.C–D. 
 16. See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2011) (accepting the 
traditionalist approach and expressly rejecting measures suggested by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit); United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(finding it prudent to allow the doctrine to progress incrementally); United States v. 
Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 524 (4th Cir. 2010) (finding “no reason to depart” from the 
traditional test).  While the Seventh Circuit arguably employed a unique semi-subjective test, 
its adherence to an incremental approach and rejection of ex ante restrictions make it 
deserving of a traditionalist classification. But see Orin Kerr, Plain View for Computer 
Searches Generates Two Circuit Splits in Two Days:  United States v. Williams and United 
States v. Mann, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 21, 2010, 11:41 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/01/21/plain-view-for-computer-searches-generates-two-circuit-
splits-in-two-days-united-states-v-williams-and-united-states-v-mann/.  
 17. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT III), 621 F.3d 1162, 1178 
(9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (offering a safe harbor of prophylactic rules for 
officers to follow in searches of electronic storage devices).  The Ninth Circuit, in an en banc 
opinion, originally made these prophylactic rules binding before revising their opinion after 
protest by the federal government. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. 
(CDT II), 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009).  For a discussion of the political pressure 
exerted by the executive after this opinion, see, for example, Thomas R. Eddlem, Fourth 
Amendment Under Seige (Again), NEW AMERICAN (Nov. 28, 2009, 1:00 PM), 
http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/usnews/constitution/2420-Fourth-amendment-
under-seige-again; David Kravets, Obama Wants Computer Privacy Ruling Overturned, 
WIRED (Nov. 25, 2009, 10:27 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/11/obama-
wants-computer-privacy-ruling-overturned/. 
 18. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit’s original decision breaking from 
the traditionalist approach advocated a subjective standard. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 
1268, 1273–75 (10th Cir. 1999).  Later circuit decisions interpreted the Carey opinion as 
raising the particularity standard for warrants for digital evidence, where files are so 
intermingled as to necessitate limitations. See United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 
1092–93 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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prophylactic measures designed to prevent general dragnet searches from 
occurring. 
Part I of this Note examines the history behind the drafting of the Fourth 
Amendment, the creation of the plain view doctrine, and how the 
underlying principles and justifications are strained in the context of 
computer searches and seizures.  Part II examines the procedures used in 
executing digital searches and the inherent problems associated with 
particularly describing places to be searched on computers.  Part III 
explores the conflict among the circuits introduced above.  Part IV proposes 
that the current approaches employed by the circuits are inadequate, and 
that prophylactic rules similar to those suggested by the Ninth Circuit19
I.  THE ORIGINAL PRINCIPLES OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, THE COURT’S 
DEPARTURE FROM THESE PRINCIPLES, AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
PLAIN VIEW EXCEPTION 
 are 
necessary to protect the fundamental right afforded by the Fourth 
Amendment to freedom from arbitrary governmental intrusion and 
unfettered police discretion. 
The formative history and principles of the Fourth Amendment animates 
judicial analysis when determining how the Fourth Amendment and the 
plain view exception should apply to new situations.20  Courts have 
consistently looked to this formative history when analyzing Fourth 
Amendment issues,21 but the use of a reasonableness balancing approach in 
many cases has weakened the historical approach.22
 
 19. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1178. 
  This section discusses 
the Fourth Amendment’s history to emphasize the spirit that should compel 
the formulation of a new regime to govern digital searches where traditional 
methods lead to the kind of search that the Fourth Amendment was drafted 
to prevent.  Part I.A examines the resistance to overbroad and unreasonable 
searches and seizures that began in Great Britain.  Part I.B explains the 
resistance to such practices in the colonies.  Part I.C discusses the 
interpretation of the Amendment from the drafting to the present day and 
the development of the balancing approach.  Lastly, Part I.D discusses the 
development of the plain view exception. 
 20. See generally M. Blane Michael, Reading from the Fourth Amendment:  Guidance 
from the Mischief That Gave it Birth, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 905 (2010).  
 21. See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009); United States v. Chadwick, 
433 U.S. 1, 7–9 (1977); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 760–61 (1969); Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363–71 (1959); 
United States v. Di Rie, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 
474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622–23 (1886). 
 22. The balancing approach employed by many courts attempts to measure “the degree 
[of intrusion] upon an individual’s privacy” against “the degree to which it is needed for the 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 
(1999). 
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A.  The English Foundations of the Fourth Amendment and the Rejection of 
Overbroad Police Discretion 
The notion of a natural right to privacy and freedom against arbitrary 
governmental intrusion predated the strong reactions against general 
warrants and writs of assistance that immediately precipitated the American 
Revolution.  The Magna Carta, the great charter of English liberties, was 
widely interpreted as conveying rights against arbitrary governmental 
intrusion.23  This interpretation has converted the Magna Carta into a 
“talismanic symbol of freedom” and helped instill this notion of privacy 
from as early as the 16th century.24  Yet, prior to the American Revolution, 
the courts and English Parliament threatened this natural right through the 
issuance of general warrants and writs of assistance.  General warrants only 
required a bare assertion that an officer suspected a violation of law, 
without any particularized information.25  Writs of assistance did not 
require any justification or judicial supervision and were valid until the 
death of the sovereign.26
The practices employed by the English crown were completely 
incongruous to the popular rhetoric of the time.  Some of the most 
influential legal theorists decried the specter of general warrants, including 
Sir Edward Coke, Sir Matthew Hale, William Hawkins, and Sir William 
Blackstone.
  These broad warrants gave officers a license to 
search wherever they wanted for whatever items they wished. 
27  The old adage that a “man’s house is his castle” had become 
commonplace from its origins in the early sixteenth century, and its 
influence converged with this movement.28  William Pitt’s famous quote to 
Parliament in 1763 read:  “The poorest man may in his cottage, bid defiance 
to all forces of the Crown.”29
The popular rhetoric among the academic community reflected that of the 
judiciary as well.  One famous series of cases involved general warrants 
issued for the arrest of anyone involved with John Wilkes’s controversial 
criticism of the Crown in the 45th volume of his journal, popularly known 
as “No. 45.”
 
30  Wilkes filed suits of trespass against the officials involved 
and emerged as a popular idol for the cause against general warrants and 
arbitrary government action.31  Judges in the “Wilkes cases” found such 
general warrants to be contrary to fundamental liberties,32
 
 23. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 151 (1999). 
 and articulated 
 24. See id. at 151–52; see also Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth 
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 671–73 & n.341 (1999). 
 25. LEVY, supra note 23, at 154–55. 
 26. Id. at 155–57. 
 27. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 
242–44 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997); LEVY supra note 23, at 152; Davies, supra note 24, at 
578–79. 
 28. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 5; LEVY, supra note 23, at 151–52; Davies, supra note 24, at 
642 & n.259; Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 197, 197–98 & n.3 (1993). 
 29. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 5. 
 30. LEVY, supra note 23, at 159. 
 31. Id. at 159–61; Davies, supra note 24, at 562–68. 
 32. Wilkes v. Wood, (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B.) 491. 
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that “it is not fit, that the . . . judging of the information should be left to the 
discretion of the officer.  The magistrate ought to judge; and should give 
certain directions to the officer.”33  In the later case of Entick v. 
Carrington,34 Lord Camden held that the power to issue warrants was 
limited by law and could not issue on executive discretion.35  This judicial 
reaction is a result of the breach of common law tradition generally 
requiring a particularized warrant.36
B.  Colonial Reactions to General Warrants and the Exercise of Unfettered 
Discretion by the Government 
 
The American colonies inherited this controversy in 1696, when King 
William III extended authority to issue writs of assistance to the colonies, 
predictably resulting in widespread abuses.37  When first extended to the 
colonies, the writs of assistance were a localized controversy,38 yet they 
were issued against considerable resistance.39
These abuses led colonists to challenge the use of general warrants in the 
courts.  In 1761, six months after the death of King George II, the chief 
customs official in Boston petitioned for new writs of assistance in the 
Massachusetts Superior Court.
 
40  James Otis, a Boston lawyer, appeared 
before the court on behalf of the people of Boston to oppose the writs.  Otis 
argued that the writ was an instrument of “slavery,” an exercise of 
“arbitrary power” and that the only legal writ was a “special warrant 
directed to specific officers.”41  The court did not side with Otis, and issued 
the general writ.42  However, this case further spurred the cause of 
independence and the feelings of discontent within the colonies.43  John 
Adams, prior to the signing of the Declaration of Independence, said that 
Otis’s “[a]rgument concerning Writs of Assistance . . . [was] the 
[c]ommencement of the Controversy between Great Britain and 
America.”44
In the period leading up to the Declaration of Independence, specific 
warrants increasingly gained favor among the legal community in 
 
 
 33. Money v. Leach, (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1075 (K.B.) 1088. 
 34. (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.). 
 35. Id. at 817–18. 
 36. See BLOOM supra note 2, at 7; Davies, supra note 24, at 655–57; Daniel M. Harris, 
The Return to Common Sense:  A Response to “The Incredible Shrinking Fourth 
Amendment”, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 25, 27–28 (1984). 
 37. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 5; Davies, supra note 24, at 659 n.306. 
 38. Prior to 1767, only Massachusetts and New Hampshire had expressly extended the 
jurisdiction of the English court authorized to issue writs of assistance to their highest courts. 
LEVY, supra note 23, at 157.  In 1767, the Townshend Acts extended the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Exchequer to the highest courts of all the colonies. Id. at 163–64. 
 39. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 5. 
 40. Id. at 6.  There is no case report for this decision, which is known colloquially as the 
“Writs of Assistance Case” or “Paxton’s Case.”  Davies, supra note 24, at 561 n.20. 
 41. LEVY, supra note 23, at 158. 
 42. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 6. 
 43. Davies, supra note 24, at 561–63 & n.2l; Maclin, supra note 28, at 221–22 & n.80. 
 44. LEVY, supra note 23, at 157–58 (omission in original). 
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America.45  After the passing of the Townshend Acts—extending the 
authority to issue general writs to the highest courts in all the colonies in 
1767—some courts resisted the issuance of general warrants by imposing 
conditions that frustrated their execution.46  Other judges expressly refused 
to issue the writs as “unconstitutional” or because they felt “without legal 
authority” to do so.47
After the signature of the Declaration of Independence, states began 
enacting their own constitutions, each with its own “bill of rights” that 
invariably contained some rejection of general warrants or a broader 
condemnation of the arbitrary governmental practices that existed under 
colonial rule.
 
48  The Massachusetts constitution was the first to frame the 
right as freedom from “unreasonable searches, and seizures.”49  At the time, 
the term “unreasonable” meant “violative of fundamental legal 
principles.”50  This interpretation of “unreasonable” by the Framers, and the 
multiple drafts of the Amendment, illustrate that they would find any 
searches conducted under warrants that did not conform to common law 
requirements—constrained by specific restrictions, issued upon probable 
cause, and determined by an independent magistrate—to be unacceptable.51
After hostilities with England ended, few states still employed general 
searches, and specific warrants became commonplace.
 
52  In the debates 
over the drafting of the Constitution, leaders proposed a bill of rights that 
omitted several of the rights considered fundamental today, but included a 
search and seizure provision.53  James Madison introduced the initial 
language for the Fourth Amendment to the 1st Congress on June 8, 1789,54
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.
 
and the final text came to read: 
55
 
 45. Id. at 158–59; see also Maclin, supra note 
 
28, at 224–26. 
 46. LEVY, supra note 23, at 164; Maclin, supra note 28, at 224–26. For example, the 
New York courts at first issued writs of assistance, but deviated from the language of 
Parliament, and after five years of being held up, found them to not be “warranted by law.” 
LEVY, supra note 23, at 164.  Virginia issued writs of assistance in 1769 but attached to them 
specific instructions found obnoxious by the customs office. Id. at 165. 
 47. LEVY, supra note 23, at 165. 
 48. For example, Virginia’s Declaration of Rights reads “general warrants . . . are 
grievous and oppressive, and ought not be granted.” VA. CONST. OF 1776, § 10.  
Pennsylvania followed suit, framing the protection as a “right” of the “people.” PA. CONST. 
OF 1776, art. X; see also THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 27 at 232–37. 
 49. MA. CONST. OF 1780, art. XIV. 
 50. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 8; see Davies, supra note 24, at 576–83. 
 51. See THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 223; Davies, supra note 24, at 
684–86; Harris, supra note 36 at 28–29.  
 52. LEVY, supra note 23, at 172–73; see BRUCE A. NEWMAN, AGAINST THAT “POWERFUL 
ENGINE OF DESPOTISM” 7 (2007). 
 53. LEVY, supra note 23, at 173; see also Davies, supra note 24, at 693. 
 54. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 9. 
 55. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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While the details of how the final wording in the Bill of Rights came to be 
agreed upon are not available, it is clear from writings at the time that the 
principle was to secure the “great and valuable privileges” of freedom from 
unreasonable searches granted “with[out] due caution.”56  The Fourth 
Amendment was an essential protection to the Framers, one that assured the 
freedom supported by a centuries-long tradition of common law and legal 
theorists.57
C.  The Fourth Amendment from the Drafting to the Present 
 
The adoption of the Fourth Amendment enormously influenced the early 
government’s behavior.  In guaranteeing the freedom from unreasonable 
search and seizure, the Framers declared a broad principle that discretionary 
police power could not be trusted.58  It was no longer acceptable for an 
officer to simply swear that he was acting in good faith and with probable 
cause to obtain a warrant with insufficient judicial scrutiny.59
The federal courts did not have an early opportunity to significantly 
interpret the Amendment, but early state cases indicate that the prevention 
of the exercise of broad power of the police was how the Fourth 
Amendment was understood to protect the people.
 
60  The first time the 
Supreme Court considered the issue was in Boyd v. United States,61 almost 
100 years after the Amendment’s drafting.  A unanimous Court found that 
forcing citizens to produce invoices to prove that certain items were not 
smuggled involved an exercise of “arbitrary power” by the government.62  
In the Court’s first opportunity to interpret the Fourth Amendment, it held 
that the right of the people should be “liberally construed” and a “close and 
literal construction . . . leads to a gradual depreciation of the right.”63  The 
Court continued to apply these principles three decades later in Weeks v. 
United States,64 where the Court again emphasized its concerns about the 
discretionary power of law enforcement, endorsing the use of particularized 
warrants to combat this discretion.65  Later, in Johnson v. United States,66 
the Court held that a warrant’s scope should be left to the judgment of a 
magistrate, rather than to the discretion of an “officer engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”67
 
 56. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 
 
27, at 238–39 (quoting THE ANTI-
FEDERALIST No. 1 (Centinel), No. 4 (The Federal Farmer)). 
 57. See Harris, supra note 36, at 29. 
 58. Maclin, supra note 28, at 229.  This discretion was widely believed to be unlawful at 
common law. Davies, supra note 24, at 578–79. 
 59. LEVY, supra note 23, at 178. 
 60. Davies, supra, note 24, at 613. 
 61. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
 62. Id. at 630. 
 63. Id. at 635. 
 64. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
 65. Id. at 389–92; see also BLOOM, supra note 2, at 13. 
 66. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
 67. Id. at 14.  In United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932), the Court echoed this 
sentiment by stating that the “informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates . . . are 
to be preferred over the hurried action of officers.” Id. at 464. 
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In Olmstead v. United States,68 the dissent found that the original 
principles underlying the Fourth Amendment should influence how it 
applies to new technologies by reiterating that the Amendment should not 
be limited to its words or “papers and effects,” and that it was meant to 
protect a general right to be free from unreasonable government 
interference.69  The majority to which the Olmstead dissent was responding 
was later overturned in Katz v. United States,70 where the Court again 
emphasized the unpalatable discretion afforded to police when the judiciary 
is absent from the warrant application process.71
Despite these early cases that consistently followed the underlying 
principles and motivations of the Fourth Amendment, the murky historical 
record of the drafting—and the ambiguous text itself—allowed the Court to 
interpret the Fourth Amendment to achieve whatever results were 
convenient.
 
72  The debate on how the Framers intended the two clauses to 
be read led to the reasonableness clause73 being read distinctly from the 
warrant clause,74 resulting in a much broader balancing test.75  The 
reasonableness approach allows for greater discretion for police officers and 
greater intrusions by the government.  The Framers had a much stronger 
view against this, but the “doctrinal evolution has been away from a sense 
of the individual’s right to be secure from government intrusions and 
toward an ever-enlarging notion of government authority to intrude.”76  As 
one commentator has stated:  “The constitutional lodestar for understanding 
the Fourth Amendment is not an ad hoc reasonableness standard; rather, the 
central meaning of the Fourth Amendment is distrust of police power and 
discretion.”77  Some argue that this interpretation of reasonableness under 
the balancing approach advocated by the Court is contradictory to that of 
the Framers.78
D.  The Development of the Plain View Doctrine 
 
The plain view doctrine generally stands for the proposition that when an 
officer is lawfully present where he can see incriminating evidence and has 
 
 68. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). 
 69. Id. at 487–88 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
 70. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 71. See id. at 358–59. 
 72. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 3; Davies, supra note 24, at 557–60; see Maclin, supra note 
28, at 237 n.140. 
 73. “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. 
IV. 
 74. “[A]nd no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized.” Id. 
 75. BLOOM, supra note 2, at 14.  Again, the Framers’ understanding of “unreasonable” 
came from Sir Edward Coke and was a synonym for illegality—not the flexible standard that 
the Court chose to adopt. Davies, supra note 24, at 576–83. 
 76. Davies, supra note 24, at 749. 
 77. Maclin, supra note 28, at 201. 
 78. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
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a legal right of access to that evidence, his detection of such evidence does 
not constitute a search or seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.79  A 
warrant is not necessary for the plain view doctrine to apply.80  Yet, one of 
the most prototypical examples of its application is where the police have a 
warrant to search specific premises for objects related to a certain crime, 
and happen upon incriminating evidence relating to crimes or suspects not 
contained in the warrant.81
The principle that officers, in the course of an otherwise constitutional 
search, can seize evidence not particularly described in a warrant has not 
always been clear.  In Marron v. United States
  As this historical discussion will show, the 
Court has continuously stated that the plain view exception was not to be 
used to permit searches that resembled general warrants. 
82—a case preceding the 
creation of the plain view exception—officers executed a search warrant for 
intoxicating liquors and articles of their manufacture.83  The officers also 
seized ledgers and bills of illegal sales of liquor.84  While the Court ruled 
that these items were lawfully seized incident to the arrest,85 it also held 
that the particularity requirement made “general searches . . . impossible 
and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another.  
As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer.”86  
This created an inherent inconsistency:  If no discretion is to be left to the 
officer, why is it acceptable that this discretion is exercised when an arrest 
is made on the premises?87
Lower courts struggled to rectify this inconsistency in Marron.
 
88  
Because of this confusion, courts throughout the twentieth century declined 
to follow Marron, and the Supreme Court implicitly recognized the 
propriety of the plain view doctrine.  The literal interpretation of the 
particularity discussion in Marron led courts to find that items could not be 
seized unless they were specified in the warrant, even if they were 
immediately incriminating.89  Many courts distinguished Marron on the 
grounds that the ledgers seized were not obviously contraband,90 or to 
disregard the doctrine when the items seized were stolen property.91
 
 79. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 
  Later, 
the Supreme Court noted that practicality justified the inclusion of evidence 
found in plain view because “it would be entirely without reason to say that 
5, § 2.2. 
 80. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465–66 (1971).  The Coolidge Court 
described cases where evidence is seized in plain sight while in “hot pursuit” of a subject, 
incident to a lawful arrest, and when under the authority of a search warrant. Id. 
 81. Id. at 465. 
 82. 275 U.S. 192 (1927). 
 83. Id. at 193–94. 
 84. Id. at 194. 
 85. Id. at 198–99. 
 86. Id. at 196. 
 87. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 5, §4.11(b). 
 88. Id. 
 89. See United States v. Coots, 196 F. Supp. 775, 779 (E.D. Tenn. 1961). 
 90. See, e.g., United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595, 597–98 (6th Cir. 1962); Joyner v. 
City of Lakeland, 90 So. 2d 118, 122 (Fla. 1956). 
 91. See Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539, 540 (D.C. Cir. 1961). 
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[an officer] must return [evidence] because it was not one of the things it 
was his business to look for.”92
In its more recent discussions, the Court has limited the breadth of the 
plain view exception by continuing to evoke the animating principles 
behind the drafting of the Fourth Amendment.
 
93  In Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire,94 any doubt as to the propriety of the plain view exception was 
put to rest.  The Court in Coolidge affirmatively recognized the long history 
of cases recognizing the exception, while still reminding the government 
that “the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a general 
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating 
at last emerges.”95  The Court noted that allowing seizure in plain view did 
not contradict the purposes of the Fourth Amendment because plain view 
does not occur until a valid search is in progress, and that the seizure of 
objects in plain view does not convert that search into a general or 
exploratory one.96  The Coolidge Court proceeded to outline the elements 
necessary to find an object seized in plain view, including a requirement 
that the police must have “inadvertently” come upon the items seized.97
The “inadvertency requirement” became problematic because the Court did 
not explain what degree of expectation was required to make discovery 
inadvertent.
 
98  Thus, the Court eliminated this requirement in Horton v. 
California99 by holding it to be a characteristic of most legitimate plain 
view seizures but not a “necessary condition.”100  The Court held that 
“evenhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of 
objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the 
subjective state of mind of the officer.”101  It rested its assumption that 
inadvertence was not necessary to protect police from conducting a general 
search on the fact that this interest is already protected by “scrupulous 
adherence” to the particularity requirement.102
 
 92. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 238 (1960). 
  The Horton Court outlined 
the three-prong test used today to evaluate whether evidence collected other 
than that contained in a search warrant was properly seized under the plain 
view exception:  the law enforcement officer must be lawfully present 
where the evidence may be plainly viewed, he or she must have lawful 
 93. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 572 (1969) (“To condone what happened here is 
to invite a government official to use a seemingly precise and legal warrant only as a ticket 
to get into a man’s home, and, once inside, to launch forth upon unconfined searches and 
indiscriminate seizures as if armed with all the unbridled and illegal power of a general 
warrant.”); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465 (1932) (“Here, the searches were 
exploratory and general and made solely to find evidence of respondents’ guilt of the alleged 
conspiracy or some other crime.”); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 501 (1925) 
(discussing in depth the particularity requirement). 
 94. 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 
 95. Id. at 466. 
 96. Id. at 467. 
 97. Id. at 468–71. 
 98. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 4.11(e). 
 99. 496 U.S. 128 (1990). 
 100. Id. at 130. 
 101. Id. at 138. 
 102. Id. at 139–40. 
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access to the item itself and, the incriminating character of the evidence 
seized must be “immediately apparent.”103
Indeed, the Court’s discussion of the particularity requirement 
emphasized that the warrant clause’s “manifest purpose” was to prevent 
general searches.
 
104
II.  SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF COMPUTERS 
  As outlined in the following sections, the execution of 
warrants for the search of computers and the lower courts’ loose application 
conflict with this professed purpose. 
The procedures involved in obtaining and executing warrants for digital 
evidence implicate the Framers’ concern over unfettered police discretion 
discussed in Part I.105  The nature of digital evidence and the investigatory 
techniques employed by the government compel the creation of a new 
scheme to protect these original concerns.  Several scholars of criminal 
justice contend that the Fourth Amendment has and will continue to be 
applied flexibly in digital evidence cases because of the uncertainty that 
exists in adapting to this new medium106—a flexibility that the Court has 
warned against in the past.107
A.  The Inapposite Characteristics of Physical and Digital Searches 
  Part II.A first explains the inherent 
differences between the search of physical environments and the search of 
computers and other digital storage devices. Part II.B outlines how these 
warrants are obtained and executed to illustrate the difficulties faced in 
attempting to preserve the Constitutional mandates of the Framers and the 
Supreme Court. 
The plain view doctrine, as defined in physical environments, takes on a 
different context in digital searches.  Officers do not interact with digital 
data in the same way, and with the same basic intuitions, as the dwellings 
considered by the Framers in drafting the Fourth Amendment.  The plain 
view exception is based on sight, a notion that is very simple to apply in the 
context of a physical environment, but which becomes more difficult with 
computers.108  Plain view could be defined as just what is open on the 
screen, whatever an officer decides to open, or some balance in between.109
 
 103. Id. at 136–37. 
  
Moreover, physical environments can only contain a limited amount of 
objects and data, which limits the intrusiveness of allowing everything in 
 104. Id. at 139–40 n.10. 
 105. See supra Part I.  
 106. See ROBERT MOORE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE 80 (2005); Arthur J. 
Carter, IV & Audrey Perry, Computer Crimes, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 313, 350–55 (2004) 
(discussing flexible approaches applied in the courts); Sheri A. Dillon et. al., Computer 
Crimes, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 503, 526–28 (1998) (same).  Courts have explicitly noted that 
flexibility is necessary. See United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1508 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 107. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 108. Susan W. Brenner & Barbara A. Frederiksen, Computer Searches and Seizures:  
Some Unresolved Issues, 8 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 39, 93–94 (2002). 
 109. Id. at 94. 
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plain view to be seized. Computers hold a wealth of information, with 
capacity doubling every two years as technology advances.110
The constraints of physical environments make it unreasonable to search 
for a stolen car inside a house, or for any number of items that cannot 
physically be in the area searched.
 
111  This consideration is not present with 
the fungibility of computer files.  Numerous judges have made the 
observation that any “clever suspect” does not store illicit materials with a 
file name indicating their contents.112  This has led courts to find that 
investigators cannot be restricted in their search of all computer files.113
The duration of the search also differs significantly.  In physical 
environments, the search ceases when the officers leave.  By contrast, the 
massive information on computers often necessitates that they be copied 
and searched off-site by an investigator.
 
114  Law enforcement will copy the 
entire hard drive, and investigators are normally free to take whatever time 
is needed within reason to sort through this information.115
Compared to a physical environment, there is much less control over 
what data is stored on a computer.  In the context of a physical 
environment, items can be positively destroyed.  In contrast, files marked 
for deletion on computers can still be recovered by investigators; as long as 
a user does not reuse a particular “cluster” of data, the file marked for 
deletion will remain undisturbed, and “slack space” on a hard drive can 
even save this information after reuse.
 
116  Temporary files created by 
programs like Microsoft Word and the automatic data retention of Internet 
browsers also add to this confusion.117  And as computers become 
integrated in businesses and people’s daily lives, it is more often necessary 
in normal criminal investigations that do not involve cyber-crimes to search 
a suspect’s computer.118
As a starting point, what constitutes a “search” or “seizure” of computer 
data that would trigger the protections of the Fourth Amendment is not 
  The question of what rules should govern these 
searches is of utmost importance. 
 
 110. Kerr, supra note 7, at 542. 
 111. Kerr, supra note 7, at 543; accord Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987); 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982). 
 112. Michael, supra note 20, at 926; see also United States v. Hill 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th 
Cir. 2006); United States v. Riley, 906 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Gray, 
78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 527 (E.D. Va. 1999). 
 113. See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 521–22 (4th Cir. 2010) (approving an 
officer’s search of every file on a computer because of the potential for concealment of 
evidence); United States v. Miranda, 325 F. App’x 858, 860 (11th Cir. 2009) (same); United 
States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090–91 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting defendant’s 
proposed search methodologies as restrictive because they provide too much potential for 
this type of camouflage); see also infra Part II.B.3. 
 114. MOORE, supra note 106, at 79. 
 115. See infra notes 165–67 and accompanying text. 
 116. Kerr, supra note 7, at 542; see also OFFICE OF LEGAL EDUC., EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. 
ATTORNEYS, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN 
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 62 (2009) [hereinafter OLE MANUAL], available at 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/ssmanual/ssmanual2009.pdf. 
 117. Kerr, supra note 7, at 542–43. 
 118. Id. at 532. 
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completely settled.  In physical environments, entering a home or other 
physical environment and moving or seizing objects therein constitutes a 
search.  However, in the context of computers, police officers do not 
“enter” the computer nor do they view the raw data upon it; they merely sift 
through the billions of individual strings of data and either open the data 
onto a display to view at the scene, copy the data, or take no action.119  This 
Note follows the Supreme Court and other prior decisions interpreting Rule 
41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.120  These cases hold that 
copying constitutes a seizure, regardless of whether the officers actually 
ever search this copied data.121
B.  How Law Enforcement Investigators Execute Warrants for the Search of 
Computers 
 
This section discusses the execution of search warrants for digital data to 
illustrate how loose restrictions complicate Fourth Amendment issues in 
later review.  Part II.B.1 explains the process for applying for a computer 
warrant and the requirements imposed by the Fourth Amendment.  Part 
II.B.2 addresses the imposition of ex ante limitations on such warrants.  Part 
II.B.3 generally discusses the common process used to search computers.  
Lastly, Part II.B.4 outlines the practical effects of these methods. 
1.  The Application and Contours of the Computer Warrant 
Several sources provide guidance for law enforcement on what needs to 
be described in a warrant and the appropriate process for obtaining 
magistrate approval.  Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
generally addresses warrant requirements, but has not provided specific 
instructions for digital evidence until recent amendments to the rule.  Rule 
41(e)(2)(B), as amended, explicitly states that warrants may issue for the 
seizure of electronic evidence for later review.122  At least one commentator 
has suggested that this and other provisions alone authorize the broad scope 
of digital searches and seizures.123
The Office of Legal Education of the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys 
has published a manual on the search and seizure of computer evidence to 
  Courts have not yet analyzed recent 
amendments to Rule 41 that include information about digital searches, 
however they support some of the practices already in place in collecting 
digital data. 
 
 119. Id. at 540.  Professor Kerr suggests that only the viewing of computer data 
constitutes a search that would trigger Fourth Amendment concerns. Id. at 556–57. 
 120. Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “Search and Seizure,” governs 
the procedures surrounding the execution of search warrants generally. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41. 
 121. See, e.g., United States v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 168–70 (1977) (explaining 
what constitutes a search in the context of pen registers); Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment 
Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE L.J. 700, 706–07 (2010). 
 122. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e)(2)(B). 
 123. See generally Andrew Vahid Moshirnia, Note, Separating Hard Fact from Hard 
Drive:  A Solution for Plain View Doctrine in the Digital Domain, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH 
609 (2010). 
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guide prosecutors and law enforcement.124  The requirements for an 
affidavit and application for a warrant to search a computer are substantially 
the same as for a physical environment.  First, the investigator must state 
that he has probable cause to believe that the computer “contains or is 
contraband, evidence of a crime, fruits of crime, or an instrumentality of a 
crime.”125  The government endorses the comparison to a container to 
explain that no special facts are necessary to establish probable cause to 
authorize the search of a computer found on premises contained in a 
warrant, so long as investigators “reasonably believe the warrant describes 
records that might be stored on that computer.”126  However, United States 
v. Payton,127 a case from the Ninth Circuit, seemed to tighten this standard 
from “could” produce evidence to “would” produce evidence128—causing 
the government to endorse the need for specific authorization to search 
computers.129  Probable cause can be based on, inter alia, an IP address, 
online account information, and off-line conduct.130
Second, a warrant must also “particularly describ[e] the place to be 
searched, and . . . things to be seized.”
 
131  Again, the Supreme Court has 
required sufficient particularity such that no discretion is left to the officer 
executing the warrant.132  This requirement is meant to prevent the issuance 
of general warrants and to delimit a narrow search that will keep the level of 
intrusion to a minimum.133  Except in the case where the actual computer is 
used as the instrumentality of a crime,134 the warrant must describe the 
content of the relevant files rather than the storage device itself.135  Courts 
have found this requirement to be more stringent in the context of 
computers because of the “huge array” of information that they are capable 
of containing.136
 
 124. OLE MANUAL, supra note 
 
116. 
 125. Id. at 63 (citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)). 
 126. Id. at 64 (internal citations omitted).  Several courts have drawn this comparison. See 
United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 711, 718 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Runyan, 275 
F.3d 449, 462–63 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d 929, 936–37 (W.D. 
Tex. 1998); United States v. Blas, No. 90-Cr-162, 1990 WL 265179, at *21 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 
4, 1990) (stating that a computer, pager, or similar devices must be treated as a “closed 
container”);  but see United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 127. 573 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 128. See Susan A. Rados, Note, United States v. Payton:  Redefining the Reasonableness 
Standard for Computer Searches and Seizures, 40 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 297, 299 
(2010). 
 129. OLE MANUAL, supra note 116, at 65. 
 130. Id. at 65–68. 
 131. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 132. See Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). 
 133. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976). 
 134. This situation arises primarily in the execution of search warrants for child 
pornography. OLE MANUAL, supra note 116, at 71 (collecting cases). 
 135. Id. at 72; see also United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that description of particular files must be included in warrant). 
 136. United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1132 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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Failure to narrow the scope of a warrant through limiting terms can turn 
such a non-specific warrant into an unconstitutional general warrant.137  
Still, many courts have failed to recognize the problems inherent in 
computer warrants that allow investigators to essentially go through every 
file and seize evidence of other crimes under the plain view doctrine.138  
Courts have explicitly acknowledged that they are unable to limit warrants 
with particularity because of the nature of technology,139 and they will 
defer to the discretion of the investigator to determine what property must 
be seized to obtain the evidence.140  Seizing upon this leeway granted by 
many courts, the government has explicitly instructed law enforcement to 
“[a]void drafting warrants in a way that would unnecessarily restrict the 
scope of the search.”141
Where particularity cannot be achieved because of the commingling of 
evidence and innocent files, some new restrictions may be necessary to 
prevent investigators from exercising unfettered discretion.
 
142  However, 
courts too often find that sufficient limiting terms are not possible, and 
choose to disregard search methodologies contained in the warrant because 
they are impractical.143
2.  Ex Ante Limitations on Computer Search Warrants 
  Rather than allowing these situations to develop, 
the techniques for issuing these warrants should change to react to this 
problem. 
The Government has stated that limitations on search methodologies can 
seriously impair an investigator’s ability to uncover evidence in computer 
searches.144  Scholars similarly have stated that such ex ante regulations are 
“constitutionally unauthorized and unwise.”145
 
 137. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Ford, 184 F.3d 566, 576 (6th Cir. 1999) (collecting 
cases). 
  Digital searches “can be as 
 138. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010); United States 
v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 535–37 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding a warrant to not be overbroad 
where the officers had to search everything to ensure they found the relevant evidence); 
United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 528–31 (E.D. Va. 1999) (same). 
 139. See, e.g., Williams, 592 F.3d at 522; United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 383 (10th 
Cir. 1986). 
 140. See United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 782–83, 786 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hill, 19 F.3d 984, 987–
89 (5th Cir. 1994); Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 301–02 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 141. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM:  A GUIDE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTORS 10 (2007) [hereinafter 
DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM]. 
 142. Cf. United States v. London, 66 F.3d 1227, 1238 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that in a 
situation where innocent documents were intermingled with the evidence sought it would be 
“difficult for the magistrate judge to be more limiting” in phrasing the warrant).  See infra 
Part IV for a discussion of proposed limitations. 
 143. OLE MANUAL, supra note 116, at 76–79 (collecting cases). 
 144. Id. at 79–83 (discussing at length the basis for refusing to limit a search through 
search methodologies). 
 145. Orin S. Kerr, Ex Ante Regulation of Computer Search and Seizure, 96 VA. L. REV. 
1241, 1244–45 (2010). 
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much an art as a science” that require on-the-spot judgment.146  The 
government has further opined that magistrate-issued restrictions on 
warrants are unnecessary because ex post judicial review is sufficient to 
protect constitutional rights.147  Still, in recent history, magistrate judges 
have begun to impose restrictions on the method and means by which a 
digital search may be conducted to cope with the specific problems 
discussed above.148  These methods have found support among scholars 
who believe that Fourth Amendment rights continue to be diminished as old 
practices are grafted into new circumstances.149
Professor Orin Kerr has put forth the argument that the use of ex ante 
regulations by magistrate judges is constitutionally impermissible.
 
150  In 
making this assertion, he points to several Supreme Court cases that seem to 
prescribe a narrow role for magistrate judges.  In Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New 
York,151 the Supreme Court found it impermissible for a magistrate judge to 
accompany officers on a search to make real time judgments of whether 
certain films constituted obscenity.152  In Dalia v. United States,153 the 
Court found that the absence of instructions on how exactly a wiretap 
would be installed did not render the warrant void for lack of 
particularity.154  And in United States v. Grubbs,155 the Court found that an 
anticipatory warrant156 did not require ex ante restrictions for the triggering 
condition to be considered valid.157  Kerr maintains that these cases are 
evidence that only certain minimum facts are necessary to satisfy the 
particularity requirement.158  Kerr suggests that Justice Scalia’s admonition 
in Grubbs that there is no general particularity requirement besides the 
place to be searched and things to be seized forecloses the use of ex ante 
limitations in computer searches.159
Putting aside the issue of their permissibility, ex ante limitations could 
take several forms, such as:  (1) “conditions limiting the seizure of 
computer hardware during the physical search,” (2) “conditions limiting the 
permitted timeframe of the electronic search,” (3) “conditions on how the 
electronic search stage must be conducted to limit access to evidence 
outside the warrant,” and (4) “conditions on when the seized hardware must 
 
 
 146. United States v. Brooks, 427 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 147. OLE MANUAL, supra note 116, at 80. 
 148. Kerr, supra note 145, at 1245. 
 149. Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 108, at 81–84, 114; Winick, supra note 9, at 102–
14. 
 150. Kerr, supra note 145, at 1261–73. 
 151. 442 U.S. 319 (1979). 
 152. Id. at 326–28. 
 153. 441 U.S. 238 (1979). 
 154. Id. at 258–59. 
 155. 547 U.S. 90 (2006). 
 156. An anticipatory warrant is a warrant granted for a place where evidence of the crime 
is not yet present, but is expected to be present sometime in the future. Id. at 94.  A 
“triggering condition,” such as the delivery of contraband, is often included. Id.  These are 
usually issued in the context of narcotics deliveries. Kerr, supra note 145, at 1267. 
 157. Grubbs, 547 U.S. at 97–98. 
 158. Kerr, supra note 145, at 1267–68. 
 159. Id. 
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be returned.”160  Limiting the search to certain keywords, as stated already 
and reiterated below, may be impractical because some files cannot be 
searched by keywords and files can be intentionally mislabeled, among 
other complications.161  This particular complication is of utmost concern 
to the government in its rejection of an approach that imposes ex ante 
limitations to restrict its investigation.162  Still, contrary to the 
government’s arguments and suggestions,163 magistrate judges have 
imposed restrictions where they feared abuse of the warrants they were 
issuing.164
3.  The Execution of the Search 
 
There are two basic stages to most computer searches:  the data 
acquisition phase, where the investigator retrieves or copies items on the 
suspect’s computer, and the data reduction phase, where the investigator 
takes the “image copy” of the hard drive and tries to tease out the desired 
evidence.165  Courts are highly deferential to imaging an entire hard drive 
because more time is needed to sort through the complexities of a digital 
search.166  Only the Ninth Circuit requires the reasons for such action to be 
particularly stated in a warrant.167
Forensic software, such as “EnCase,” is typically employed to assist in 
the execution of a computer search.
  This lenient time period allows for a 
much more extensive search and can be considerably more intrusive based 
on the thorough processes that are required. 
168  Searches with this software are 
conducted at both a “logical” and “physical” level.169  The logical approach 
is conducted by searching for the particular type of file described in the 
warrant, such as an image.  It will pull up all files that have extensions 
commonly associated with images, such as “.jpg.”  However, because users 
can change these extensions easily, the physical approach is necessary to 
locate files whose extensions have been altered by searching for “file 
headers” that cannot be changed.170
 
 160. Kerr, supra note 
 
145, at 1249. 
 161. OLE MANUAL, supra note 116, at 79. 
 162. See infra notes 335–38, 372–73 and accompanying text. 
 163. OLE MANUAL, supra note 116, at 80. 
 164. Kerr, supra note 145, at 1245. 
 165. OLE MANUAL, supra note 116, at 78. This process is also called “imaging” and 
“analysis.” Id. at 86.  Some suggest a third, intermediate stage “authentication” that involves 
making forensic matches between objects found on the computer and what was being sought 
in the warrant before examining it, a much more restrictive approach than is taken by most 
officers when searching computers.  Ty E. Howard, Don’t Cache Out Your Case:  
Prosecuting Child Pornography Possession Laws Based on Images Located in Temporary 
Internet Files, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1232–33 (2004). 
 166. OLE MANUAL, supra note 116, at 77. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 89.  The OLE Manual also states that this has no effect on Fourth Amendment 
issues. Id. 
 169. Kerr, supra note 7, at 544–45. 
 170. Id.; see Michael, supra note 20, at 926 (explaining problems with mislabeling); see 
also, e.g., United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
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The process is similar for text files.  The logical search is a first attempt 
to find the desired materials by pinpointing a search to where they might be 
expected to be found (such as by keyword, grouping, date, or author), and 
the physical search almost indiscriminately searches throughout the entire 
hard drive.171  This process is exhaustive and intrusive, since an 
investigator will look at all files of a given type or header rather than 
limiting his search in a more cautious way.  Furthermore, the searches for 
text files and for file headers can include an error rate to account for 
misspellings, thus returning results of completely unrelated items sharing a 
few letters with the desired item.172
Investigators can also search for files using a “hash”—a “complicated 
mathematical operation, performed by a computer on a string of data, that 
can be used to determine whether two files are identical.”
 
173  Law 
enforcement organizations keep records of common hash values for certain 
files associated with crimes, most often child pornography.174  Even using 
this method, suspects can encrypt files and the decryption process can be 
lengthy and often fruitless.175  Thus, “hash” searches are less effective and 
never used exclusively.  Faced with all these limitations in less intrusive 
search methods, magistrates and courts afford officers significant discretion.  
While seemingly necessary, this may tread too heavily on the underlying 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment—reducing the discretion of law 
enforcement officers.  Law enforcement officers are essentially given 
authority to open whichever files they deem necessary to their 
investigation.176
4.  The Practical Effects of Digital Search Methods 
 
These search methods lead investigators to review copious amounts of 
materials on a computer, including a host of documents not included in the 
search warrant.  Searching among commingled records is inevitable, and a 
cursory examination may be necessary.177  Courts have found that in the 
context of physical searches, this should constitute a “brief perusal” of each 
document to determine if it falls within the scope of the warrant, and seizure 
of items outside the warrant can only occur if their incriminating nature is 
immediately apparent.178  However, in digital searches, this brief perusal is 
much more intrusive.179
 
Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 523 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 978 (9th 
Cir. 2006). 
 
 171. Kerr, supra note 7, at 545–46. 
 172. Id. at 546. 
 173. Id. at 541; see Howard, supra note 165, at 1233–35. 
 174. See Kerr, supra note 10, at 546. 
 175. Id. at 546–47. 
 176. See supra note 113 and accompanying text; infra notes 204, 319 and accompanying 
text; infra Part IV. 
 177. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n.11 (1976). 
 178. See United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 179. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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Nevertheless, courts have followed the reasoning used in physical cases 
to support perusing files on a computer.180  Plain view in physical searches 
is easier to apply because of the intuitive distinction between what is hidden 
and what is exposed.181  By applying it in the digital context, courts are 
affording law enforcement almost limitless discretion.  A search warrant for 
a physical environment does not necessarily include all objects contained 
therein,182 but again, this is exactly how many computer searches are 
conducted.  While it may be true that “[t]here is no way to know what is in 
a file without examining its contents,”183
III.  CIRCUIT BOARDS AND SPLITS:  THE CONFLICT OF APPLYING THE PLAIN 
VIEW EXCEPTION TO DIGITAL SEARCHES 
 that rationale is much less 
destructive in the context of a file cabinet where the documents therein are 
limited both in number and in the subject matter they likely contain.  The 
practical difficulties inherent in these searches should not justify added 
deference to police officers. 
Courts have struggled with how to apply the plain view exception to 
digital searches in light of the practical difficulties discussed above.184
Part III.A explores the holdings of the circuits that adopt the traditionalist 
approach, as well as the circumstances of those cases, to highlight its 
potential for abuse.  Part III.B discusses the approaches of the Ninth and 
Tenth Circuits, which have, to different degrees, suggested the imposition 
of ex ante limitations to help protect Fourth Amendment rights before they 
are violated. 
  This 
part analyzes the varying interpretations of the problem among the circuits, 
and the differing opinion regarding whether to adopt new practices. 
A.  ‘RAM’ing a Square Peg into a Round Hole:  The Traditionalist 
Approach 
In two 2010 decisions, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits reacted to the 
changing tide of cases in both the Ninth and Tenth Circuits by adhering to 
the traditional application of the Horton three-prong test, and found that 
new technology did not justify new principles.185  More recently, the Third 
Circuit followed the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, expressly rejecting the 
Ninth Circuit’s prophylactic rules.186
 
 180. See, e.g., United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281, 1290 (11th Cir. 2007); Manno v. 
Christie, No. 08-3254, 2008 WL 4058016, at *4 (D.N.J. Aug. 22, 2008); United States v. 
Potts, 559 F. Supp. 2d 1162, 1175–76 (D. Kan. 2008); United States v. Fumo, No. 06-319, 
2007 WL 3232112, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2007). 
  Several other courts have been 
similarly hesitant to depart from fundamental doctrines when faced with the 
 181. See Kerr, supra note 7, at 554. 
 182. See id. at 555. 
 183. United States v. Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2004). 
 184. See supra Part II. 
 185. See United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785–86 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 523 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 186. United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 233–34 (3d Cir. 2011). 
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needs of law enforcement in searching and seizing digital information.187  
They often find that limiting police discretion in these circumstances is 
unnecessary; search protocols will only assist criminals at the expense of 
effective investigation.188  Several commentators agree that the Ninth 
Circuit’s suggestions are excessive and improper, and that law enforcement 
is better served through adherence to the traditionalist approach.189
1.  Fourth Circuit 
  
Whatever their support, these sample cases display the tremendous 
discretion afforded to law enforcement in the execution of digital searches. 
In United States v. Williams,190 the Fourth Circuit upheld the seizure of 
child pornography and weaponry found while executing a search relating to 
threatening messages sent to a Baptist elementary school.191 The officer 
investigating the threats approached a magistrate for a warrant to search the 
defendant’s home for evidence of crimes involving threats and vulgar 
communications made to schoolchildren.192  To justify a computer search, 
the officer cited the nature of the communications, and that, in his 
experience, those engaged in the sexual exploitation of children keep 
documents and images related to these crimes on electronic storage 
devices.193  The magistrate judge issued a search warrant authorizing the 
collection of “[a]ny and all computer systems and digital storage media, 
videotapes, videotape recorders, documents, photographs, and 
Instrumentalities indicat[ive] of the offense.”194
 
 187. See United States v. Miranda, 325 F. App’x 858, 860 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying the 
plain view doctrine in a straightforward manner, likening computer files to intermingled 
documents, and finding that law enforcement has the right to search all files on any digital 
device it has a warrant to search); Hill, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 1090–91; Rosa v. Virginia, 628 
S.E.2d 92, 94–97 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). 
  Pursuant to this warrant, 
the officers seized all electronic storage and media devices for a later 
search. 
 188. United States v. Hanna, No. 07-CR-20355, 2008 WL 2478330, at *6–7 (E.D. Mich. 
June 17, 2008) (rejecting the argument that a computer search should have been limited to 
particular search protocol because “[c]omputer files are easy to disguise or rename”); United 
States v. Maali, 346 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1245–47 (M.D. Fla. 2004) (allowing a general search 
of all computer files and finding that the lack of a detailed search protocol is acceptable 
because it is not the scope, but the reasonableness of the search that matters constitutionally); 
Wisconsin v. Schroeder, 613 N.W.2d 911, 915–17 (Wis. 2000) (finding the search of all 
user-created files to be an acceptable way for police to look for evidence within the scope of 
the warrant). 
 189. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 145, at 1261–73; Vincent Angermeier, Comment, 
Swinging for the Fences:  How Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. Missed the Ball on Digital 
Searches, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1587, 1587 (2010); Scott D. Blake, Note,  Let’s 
Be Reasonable:  Fourth Amendment Principles in the Digital Age, 5 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 
491, 493 (2010); Timothy C. Cedar, Note, The Guidelines of Comprehensive Drug Testing, 
Inc.:  A Measured Approach?, 89 OR. L. REV. 351, 383 (2010).  
 190. 592 F.3d 511 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 191. Id. at 514. 
 192. Id. at 515. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. (alteration in original). 
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In the subsequent off-site search, an investigating agent reported that he 
had located “many deleted images” of child erotica,195 and that anonymizer 
software had been installed.196  The agent continued his search through all 
the suspect’s electronic storage devices and found a DVD labeled “Virus 
Shield, Quarant[in]ed Files, Destroy” that contained child pornography.197  
Williams was charged with possession of child pornography and possession 
of an unregistered firearm.198  After his conviction, Williams appealed the 
denial of his motion to suppress the pornography.199  In his appeal, 
Williams argued that the police did not sufficiently limit their search when 
they searched every file on his computer.200  He contended that allowing 
plain view in this context would “read . . . the warrant requirement out of 
the Fourth Amendment,” and that the officers only used the warrant in his 
case as a vehicle for gaining access to the computer to search for evidence 
of child pornography that they suspected him of possessing from the outset 
of the search—meaning that the officers clearly had not stumbled across the 
files “inadvertently.”201
The court, after recognizing that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment 
was to prevent general searches, stated that “some innocuous documents 
will be examined, at least cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, 
in fact, among those papers authorized to be seized.”
 
202  The court held that 
the warrant gave the officers the authorization to “open each file on the 
computer and view its contents, at least cursorily, to determine whether the 
file fell within the scope of the warrant's authorization.”203  Based on this 
conclusion that officers had a lawful right of access to every file, the three-
prong Horton test was applied to find that the seized items were in plain 
view.204  Finding the analogy to a file cabinet to be satisfactory, the court 
found “no reason to depart [from the traditional objective test] in the 
context of electronic files.”205
 
 195. Id. at 516.  “Child erotica” is non-pornographic images of children, often used for 
sexual gratification. Id. at 515 n.1. 
  Williams affords investigators the broadest 
authority to search and seize evidence of crimes by allowing the plain view 
doctrine to apply as it does in physical searches, effectively permitting the 
search of every file. 
 196. Id. at 516. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 517. 
 200. Id. at 518. 
 201. Id.  This assertion of the previously invalidated inadvertency requirement is based 
upon United States v. Carey, 172 F. 3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999), discussed infra Part III.B.1. 
 202. Williams, 592 F.3d at 519–20 (quoting Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 
n.11 (1976)). 
 203. Id. at 521. 
 204. Id. at 522. 
 205. Id. at 524. 
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2.  Seventh Circuit 
In United States v. Mann,206 the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the 
restrictive approach,207 and found that it was more prudent to allow the 
doctrine to progress incrementally on the facts of individual cases, rather 
than abandoning the plain view doctrine in digital searches altogether.208  
Police received a tip that the defendant placed a secret video camera in a 
women’s locker room.209  A state prosecutor sought and received a broad 
warrant to search his home for “video tapes, CD's or other digital media, 
computers, and the contents of said computers, tapes, or other electronic 
media, to search for images of women in locker rooms or other private 
areas.”210  Officers executed the warrant and seized Mann’s computer, 
laptop, and external hard drive before charging him with voyeurism.211
Officers did not search these devices until several months later.
 
212  The 
officers created a copy of each hard drive and then used software called 
“forensic tool kit” (FTK)213 to catalog the contents of the computer by 
creating a list of all “known file formats” (KFF Alert) on a hard drive.214  
KFF Alert flags files previously submitted by law enforcement, most of 
which are child pornography.215  After searching through the flagged files 
and others, the officers found a significant amount of child pornography 
and several videos of the female locker room in question.216  The district 
court denied Mann’s motion to suppress the child pornography because 
they found it within the scope of the warrant for the officer to search all the 
files on the computer.217  Mann entered a conditional guilty plea and argued 
on appeal that the use of the FTK software and KFF filter to locate images 
of child pornography when the warrant authorized the collection of digital 
media evidencing recordings of women in locker rooms and public places 
was impermissible.218
The Mann court first noted the inherent problem of limiting computer 
searches where evidence “could be nearly anywhere on . . . [a] computer[]” 
because of “manipulat[ion] to hide [file] contents.”
 
219  When the officer 
testified at the suppression hearing, he stated that he “‘would search in all 
the files if [he] felt it necessary . . . [or] pertinent to [his] case.’”220
 
 206. 592 F.3d 779 (7th Cir. 2010). 
  The 
 207. See infra Part III.B. 
 208. Mann, 592 F.3d at 785. 
 209. Id. at 780. 
 210. Id. at 780–81. 
 211. Id. at 781. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id.  FTK software creates a list of all files on a computer to let an officer know how 
many files of each format (documents, images, etc.) are present on a hard drive, and 
indicates whether they are encrypted or not, among other functions. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 781–82. 
 218. Id. at 782–83. 
 219. Id. at 782. 
 220. Id. at 783. 
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court found that the use of the FTK software was acceptable even though it 
flagged files containing evidence of crimes not listed in the warrant because 
officers must be able to look for evidence “virtually anywhere on [a] 
computer[].”221  As to the four “flagged ‘KFF Alert’ files,” the court found 
that once they were flagged, the officer “knew (or should have known)” that 
files in the database containing these known child pornography issues 
would be outside the warrant, but deemed it harmless error, as ample 
evidence existed from a previous search.222
The court held that it “believe[d] the more considered approach would be 
to allow the contours of the plain view doctrine to develop incrementally 
through the normal course of fact-based case adjudication,” and simply 
urged “caution” in following the Fourth Amendment’s requirements in 
these cases.
 
223
3.  Third Circuit 
  This traditional approach approved of the broad search of 
nearly all files on a computer and approved the officer’s statement that he 
found it in his discretion to do so. 
In Stabile v. United States,224 the defendant wrote over $150,000 in 
counterfeit checks to maintain a mortgage he defaulted on before being 
investigated.225  Upon learning of his counterfeit checks, Secret Service 
Special Agents Albanese and Croes traveled to Stabile’s home to gather 
information.226  Upon arrival, they requested his wife’s consent to a search 
of their home, which she granted.227  The officers discovered physical 
evidence adjacent to Stabile’s computer that they believed related to the 
alleged bank fraud.228  The agents called the local prosecutor’s office, 
which sent over computer crimes specialists to disconnect the hard drive.229  
In the course of their search, the agents also found DVDs that they believed 
contained child pornography.  However, upon examination they were found 
to be innocuous.230
Once in possession of the hard drives, the agents did not apply for a state 
search warrant until almost three months later.
 
231
 
 221. Id. at 784.  But see CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that use of 
such software to locate well-known illegal files may not be used without specific 
authorization in the warrant). 
  The warrant they 
received authorized a search for evidence of bank crimes as well as child 
 222. Mann, 592 F.3d at 784–85.  While at least one commentator has called this approach 
unique, see Kerr, supra note 16, it essentially imposes no significant limitations on an 
officer’s discretion, and thus will be deemed “traditionalist” for purposes of this Note. 
 223. Mann, 592 F.3d at 785–86 (quoting CDT II, 579 F.3d at 989 (Callahan, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
 224. 633 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 225. Id. at 224. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. at 224–25. 
 228. Id. at 225. 
 229. Id.  
 230. Id. at 226. 
 231. Id.  The agents’ proffered reason for this was that one of them was busy on a 
presidential detail. Id. 
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pornography, despite the fact that no probable cause existed after local law 
enforcement had reviewed the DVDs and found no evidence.232  The agents 
learned of this error and instructed the computer crimes specialist, Detective 
Vanadia, to stop searching and contact the Secret Service if he came across 
evidence of crimes other than bank fraud.233
While reviewing the evidence, Vanadia highlighted a folder with the 
label “Kazvid.”  The detective testified that it was associated with the peer-
to-peer network Kazaa,
 
234 which he explained is often used to transfer child 
pornography.235  The detective “highlighted” the folder—a process that 
allowed him to view the file names inside—and found several video files 
with suggestive titles.236  The court noted that “although Vanadia admitted 
that he . . . did not believe these video files contained evidence of financial 
crimes, Vanadia proceeded to open twelve different video files . . . to 
‘confirm’ that they contained child pornography.”237  After discovering 
child pornography, the officer contacted Agent Albanese and the local 
prosecutor’s office.238
Agent Albanese then received a federal search warrant for child 
pornography based upon the file names viewed in the Kazvid folder.
 
239  
This did not mention that Detective Vanadia had actually opened the 
files.240  After conducting the search and seizing the child pornography, 
Stabile was arrested and indicted for bank fraud and receipt of child 
pornography.241  The district court denied Stabile’s motion to suppress, 
rejecting his argument that Vanadia exceeded the scope of the warrant on 
the basis of the inevitable discovery and independent source doctrines.242  
The judge convicted Stabile in a bench trial with several stipulations, 
among them the right to appeal the suppression motion.243
On appeal, Stabile challenged his conviction on myriad Fourth 
Amendment issues.  Among those was the scope of the plain view doctrine 
as it applied to Detective Vanadia’s search.
 
244
 
 232. Id.  
  While Stabile argued that 
even the file names inside the Kazvid folder were not in plain view, the 
 233. Id. at 226–27. 
 234. Peer-to-peer networks allow users to share files over a network without a central 
server. Id. at 227. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id.  
 237. Id. 
 238. Id.  
 239. Id.  
 240. Id. at 227–28. 
 241. Id. at 228. 
 242. Id. at 228–29.  The independent source doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary 
rule that allows admission of “evidence initially discovered during, or as a consequence of, 
an unlawful search, but later obtained independently from activities untainted by the initial 
illegality.” Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 537 (1988).  The inevitable discovery 
doctrine allows otherwise tainted evidence to be admitted if “the information ultimately or 
inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.” Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 
444 (1984). 
 243. Stabile, 633 F.3d at 230. 
 244. Id. at 237. 
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government argued that the contents of those files were appropriate to 
search.245  The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding and 
reasoning.246  Rejecting the argument that Detective Vanadia knew that the 
Kazvid folder likely would not contain evidence of bank fraud, the court 
cited the usual difficulties posed by mislabeling, and the fact that subjective 
intent of the officer is irrelevant.247  They found that after using limited 
search methods, “examin[ing] suspicious and out-of-place folders, such as 
the Kazvid folder” was proper.248  The court found a search of all the file 
names in the Kazvid folder reasonable, and left open the question of 
viewing their contents.249  This ambiguity leaves open the possibility that 
there are no limitations on what an officer may view on a computer.  The 
Third Circuit expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s suggestion to “forswear 
reliance on the plain view doctrine,” finding the “more considered 
approach” would allow the doctrine to develop incrementally.250
B.  Tough Times Call for Prophylactic Measures:  The Restrictive 
Approach 
 
Unlike the traditionalist view, circuit courts that suggest the restrictive 
approach have resisted deferring entirely to the inherent difficulties in 
executing digital searches.  The Ninth and Tenth Circuits, to different 
degrees, advocate a “higher” particularity standard251 where computer 
warrants are used to restrict the wide discretion otherwise afforded to 
officers executing digital searches.  Many scholars agree that digital 
searches pose troubling issues to Fourth Amendment protections, and the 
Ninth Circuit’s prophylactic measures were at least a step in the right 
direction.252  Critics, while not always believing that the traditionalist 
approach is best, challenge the legitimacy of placing restrictions on the 
execution of searches as being unwise, constitutionally impermissible, or in 
direct conflict with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.253
 
 245. Id.  
 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 239–40. 
 248. Id. at 240. 
 249. Id. at 242. 
 250. Id. at 241 n.16. 
 251. This Note argues that prophylactic rules similar to those suggested by the Ninth 
Circuit are not imposing a “higher” standard, but doing no more than adhering to the 
particularity requirement. See infra Part IV.B.4. 
 252. See, e.g., Michael, supra note 20 at 927–28; David H. Angeli et. al, The Plain View 
Doctrine and Computer Searches:  Balancing Law Enforcement’s Investigating Needs with 
Privacy Rights in the Digital Age, CHAMPION, Oct. 2010, at 18, 23; Bryan K. Weir, 
Comment, It’s (Not So) Plain to See:  The Circuit Split on the Plain View Doctrine in Digital 
Searches, 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 83, 121 (2010). 
 253. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 145, at 1261–73; Moshirnia, supra note 123 at 626–35. 
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1.  Tenth Circuit 
In United States v. Carey,254 the Tenth Circuit found that child 
pornography discovered in the execution of a search warrant for other 
crimes was not in plain view because the officer knew he expanded the 
scope of the warrant by abandoning his search for drugs to search for child 
pornography.255  While executing a warrant for “names, telephone 
numbers, ledger receipts, addresses, and other documentary evidence 
pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled substances,”256 the 
investigating officer observed several sexually suggestive titles with a label 
commonly associated with images.257  The officer admitted he had never 
encountered a situation where such labels were used to disguise the sort of 
documentary evidence he was seeking.258  “Undaunted,” he “explore[d] the 
directories and encountered some files he ‘was not familiar with.’”259  The 
officer did not obtain a second warrant, but believed that he “had to search 
these files as well as any other files contained [on the computer].”260  After 
discovering child pornography in these files, the defendant was convicted 
for their possession.261
After his conviction, the defendant appealed on the grounds that the 
search conducted by the investigating officer “transformed the warrant into 
a ‘general warrant’ and resulted in a general and illegal search of the 
computers and their files.”
 
262  The government contended that the search of 
a computer was comparable to a file cabinet and the common concerns 
about mislabeling.263
The court found that after the investigating officer opened the first image 
file and discovered child pornography, he continued his search expecting to 
find more of the same.
 
264  Under these circumstances, the court found that 
the discovery of these images was therefore not “inadvertent[],”265 and he 
had conducted an “unconstitutional general search.”266  It further stated that 
the comparison to a file cabinet was inappropriate and that the enormous 
amount of intermingled data present on computers necessitates the 
“intermediate step of sorting various types of documents and then only 
search[ing] the ones specified in a warrant.”267
 
 254. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999). 
  The court instructed that 
 255. Id. at 1274. 
 256. Id. at 1270. 
 257. Id. 
 258. Id. at 1270 & n.2. 
 259. Id. at 1271. 
 260. Id. (alteration in original). 
 261. Id. at 1270. 
 262. Id. at 1271–72. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 1273. 
 265. Id.  While inadvertence as an element for the plain view doctrine was eliminated in 
Horton v. California, see supra note 100 and accompanying text, the court based its findings 
on the fact that the officer knew he was going outside the scope of the search. Carey, 172 
F.3d at 1273. 
 266. Id. at 1276. 
 267. Id. at 1274–75. 
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officers should have to seek a magistrate’s approval on specific limitations 
to protect Fourth Amendment rights.268  The court further found that 
because the officers had seized the computer and searched it off-site, there 
was no reason to rummage through all the files without sticking to a narrow 
search to find the information specified in the warrant.269
The Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Carey arguably deserves a unique 
designation as a subjective test, recognizing that “inadvertence is a 
characteristic of most legitimate ‘plain-view’ seizures” and was thus 
“certainly relevant to [the] inquiry.”
 
270  However, the court noted its 
findings were fact intensive,271 and many courts distinguish Carey based on 
these grounds.272  Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit has interpreted the 
opinion to raise the particularity standard of warrants for digital evidence, 
where files are so intermingled as to necessitate limitations.273  United 
States v. Walser274 held that “when officers come across relevant computer 
files intermingled with irrelevant computer files, they ‘may seal or hold’ the 
computer ‘pending approval by a magistrate of the conditions and 
limitations on a further search’ of the computer.”275  It further held the 
“underlying premise in Carey is that officers conducting searches (and the 
magistrates issuing warrants for those searches) cannot simply conduct a 
sweeping, comprehensive search of a computer's hard drive.”276  In United 
States v. Riccardi,277 the court found a warrant lacked the specificity 
required by Carey and its progeny where the warrant did not contain “as 
much specificity as the government's knowledge and circumstances 
allow.”278  However, the court, while finding that the use of search 
methodologies is proper and sometimes necessary, did not require search 
methodologies to be crafted in all cases it reviews for the search to be found 
reasonable.279
 
 268. Id. at 1275. 
 
 269. Id. at 1275–76. 
 270. Id. at 1277 (this statement was made in the court’s order on petition for rehearing). 
 271. Id. at 1276. 
 272. See, e.g., United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 783 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Fiscus, 64 F. App’x 157, 163–
64 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 273. See, e.g., United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092–94 (10th Cir. 2009) 
(explaining that Carey attempted to encourage the use of limitations on search warrants, 
pointing to the dicta that “suggested methods to constrain searches, keying on the type of 
files identified in the warrant, file names, key word searches, directory structure,” yet still 
finding that such restrictions, at least in the case at hand, would be “folly”). 
 274. 275 F.3d 981 (10th Cir. 2001). 
 275. Id. at 986 (quoting Carey, 172 F.3d at 1275).  
 276. Id. 
 277. 405 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 278. Id. at 863. 
 279. See, e.g., United States v. Burke, No. 10-3030, 2011 WL 310520, at *8 (10th Cir. 
Feb. 2, 2011); United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1092–93 (10th Cir. 2009). 
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2.  Ninth Circuit 
Where the Tenth Circuit stopped short, the Ninth Circuit pressed 
forward.  In United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT II), a 
limited en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit initially mandated that officers 
waive reliance on the plain view doctrine in digital searches and follow a 
set of prophylactic rules designed to protect Fourth Amendment rights.280  
This ruling led to an appeal by then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan and 
twenty-two other federal attorneys for a full en banc rehearing to reconsider 
what they found to be “sweeping new rules for warrants to search 
computers that are having an immediate and detrimental effect on law 
enforcement efforts.”281  The court eventually decided to revise its opinion, 
making these “sweeping new rules” a safe haven and limited its holding to a 
test that asks the judiciary to employ “greater vigilance” in striking the 
correct balance between private and governmental interests in digital 
searches (CDT III).282
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. involved three cases 
consolidated on appeal stemming from the government’s investigation of 
the Bay Area Lab Cooperative (BALCO).  BALCO allegedly distributed 
illegal steroids to Major League Baseball (MLB) players.
 
283  The 
government began investigating BALCO in August 2002 and eventually 
gathered enough evidence to believe at least ten MLB players had received 
drugs from BALCO.284  The government was aware that MLB and the 
Major League Baseball Players Association (MLBPA) had entered into a 
collective bargaining agreement in which the players consented to 
anonymous and confidential drug testing solely to let MLB determine the 
magnitude of steroid use to fashion any necessary policies.285  As part of 
the BALCO investigation, the government served MLB with a subpoena 
requesting the test results of eleven players that had connections with 
BALCO.286  MLB denied that they were in possession of those records.287
The government then subpoenaed third-party drug test administrators of 
Comprehensive Drug Testing (CDT) and Quest for drug testing information 
relating to all MLB players.
 
288  After CDT and Quest continuously 
challenged the scope of the subpoena, the government served them with a 
new subpoena modified to request only the tests of ten of the eleven MLB 
players initially under investigation.289
 
 280. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 1006 (9th Cir. 2009). 
  After the MLBPA continued to 
 281. Eddlem, supra note 17. 
 282. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1177 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 283. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc. (CDT I), 513 F.3d 1085, 1089 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at 1118 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 286. Id. at 1090 & n.7 (majority opinion). 
 287. Id. at 1090. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 1090 & n.7. 
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challenge the subpoenas, the government obtained warrants to search both 
laboratories for evidence relating to the BALCO investigation.290
The original warrants, issued on April 7, 2004, authorized the seizure of 
the records of the ten BALCO-related MLB players listed in the subpoena, 
as well as materials “detailing or explaining” CDT or Quest’s 
“administration of Major League Baseball’s drug testing program.”
 
291  The 
warrants authorized investigators to copy and search electronic files off-
site.292  It directed that “computer personnel”293 choose the best course to 
capture the data sought, and “appropriately trained personnel” would review 
and segregate the relevant data, returning anything outside the scope of the 
warrant.294  Furthermore, the search of such intermingled records and 
entries in directories in the Ninth Circuit must comply with the procedures 
outlined in United States v. Tamura295
On April 8, 2004, the government executed both the CDT and the Quest 
warrants.  Twelve federal agents entered the CDT laboratory and seized the 
“Tracey” directory containing all of the computer files for the sports drug-
testing program.
 for the segregation of physical 
evidence. 
296  Back at his office, the primary case agent conducted 
the search over objections from CDT’s legal counsel, who had requested 
that a magistrate or special master conduct the investigation.297  The agent 
found five sub-directories related to MLB, as well as items authorized for 
seizure in the warrant, including the master list of positive test results.298  
The Quest warrant was executed the same day.299  Though the original 
warrants only provided for the seizure of the records of the ten players for 
which there existed probable cause, the investigators gained access to the 
test results of all the players in the anonymous testing.300
After this broad search of the “Tracey” directory, the government 
pursued authorization to seize all records pertaining to its investigation, 
including the test results of all players.
 
301  Between April 30 and May 6 of 
2004, investigators obtained warrants and subpoenas in three separate 
districts (District of Nevada, and the Central and Northern Districts of 
California) that allowed for broad seizure of all electronic records.302  After 
their execution, CDT sought return of the records in the three districts in 
which magistrates had granted the warrants and subpoenas.303
 
 290. Id. at 1091. 
  Judges 
 291. Id.  
 292. Id. at 1092–93. 
 293. Id. at 1093.  The warrant defined computer personnel as “law enforcement personnel 
trained in searching and seizing computer data.” Id. at 1092 (internal quotations omitted). 
 294. Id. 
 295. 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 296. CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1092. 
 297. Id. at 1120–21 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 298. Id. at 1093 (majority opinion). 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 1093–94. 
 301. Id. at 1094. 
 302. Id. at 1093 n.20, 1099. 
 303. Id. at 1094. 
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James Mahan, Susan Illston, and Florence-Marie Cooper all condemned the 
government’s practices in their decisions on these motions.304
In his order to return the evidence seized under the Nevada warrant (the 
Mahan Order), Judge Mahan found that the government “callously 
disregarded the affected players’ constitutional rights” and failed to follow 
procedures set forth in United States v. Tamura
 
305 pertaining to the search 
of intermingled records.306  Judge Cooper similarly criticized the 
government’s failure to follow Tamura in her order to return the evidence 
seized under the warrant granted in the Northern District of California 
(Cooper Order).307  Judge Illston went so far as to call the government’s 
actions unreasonable and evidence of harassment in quashing the subpoenas 
in question (Illston Quashal).308
The government appealed these three decisions, which were considered 
together by the Ninth Circuit.  In January of 2008, after vacating a previous 
decision, a three-judge panel affirmed the Mahan Order, but reversed the 
Cooper Order and the Illston Quashal, finding that the government acted 
reasonably.
 
309  The Ninth Circuit granted a petition to rehear the case en 
banc.  Part III.B.2.a evaluates the limited en banc rehearing that created a 
set of prophylactic rules adopted from Tamura to protect Fourth 
Amendment rights in the execution of computer search warrants.310  Part 
III.B.2.b outlines the reaction to this opinion by the government and other 
courts, while also detailing the revised opinion311
a.  CDT II and the Prophylactic Rules Described Therein 
 that removed the binding 
effect of the original protective measures outlined in CDT II. 
Several months after the issuance of the 2008 decision, all active, non-
recused judges granted a motion for a limited en banc hearing of the issues 
presented upon appeal.312  The en banc panel of eleven judges reconsidered 
the original panel’s findings on each of the orders while “tak[ing] the 
opportunity to guide [their] district and magistrate judges in the proper 
administration of search warrants and grand jury subpoenas for 
electronically stored information.”313
The court first determined that the Cooper Order was binding because the 
government failed to appeal those findings in a timely manner.
 
314
 
 304. Id. at 1094–95 & n.20; id. at 1125–27 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
  The 
court found that the evidence ordered returned by Judge Cooper, while 
seized under a broad warrant based on a general concern about the inability 
 305. 694 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 306. CDT I, 513 F.3d at 1094. 
 307. Id. at 1125–27 (Thomas, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
 308. Id. at 1095 (majority opinion). 
 309. Id. 
 310. CDT II, 579 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 311. 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 312. United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 545 F.3d 1106 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 313. CDT II, 579 F.3d at 994. 
 314. Id. at 994. 
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to efficiently segregate information, “wisely” contained restrictions on the 
methods of search and seizure—restrictions that the government 
“completely ignored.”315  The court also mentioned the binding effect of 
the Illston Quashal that necessarily rejected the government’s arguments 
about the scope of the warrant.316
The court, having established the preclusive effects of these findings, 
moved on to the panel’s reversal of the Mahan Order.  The en banc panel 
supported Judge Mahan’s findings that “the government callously 
disregarded the affected players’ constitutional rights” and failed to follow 
the guidelines contained in Tamura.
 
317  The panel rejected the 
government’s argument that it had followed Tamura because any other 
player’s positive test results were discovered pursuant to the plain view 
doctrine.318  As to the proper scope of the plain view doctrine, the court 
found:  “If the government can’t be sure whether data may be concealed, 
compressed, erased or booby-trapped without carefully examining the 
contents of every file—and we have no cavil with this general 
proposition—then everything the government chooses to seize will, under 
this theory, automatically come into plain view.”319  When this problem is 
presented, the court first suggested that investigators “forswear reliance on 
the plain view doctrine or any similar doctrine that would allow it to retain 
data to which it has gained access only because it was required to segregate 
seizable from non-seizable data.”320  The court also mandated that the 
method chosen to search data must be designed to find that which is 
seizable and only that—a goal that could be accomplished by complex 
hashing tools as outlined earlier.321
The court also criticized the government’s failure to use “computer 
personnel” in the initial review of the seized data, rather than allowing the 
primary case agent to do it himself.
 
322  The specialist did nothing to 
segregate the data after making his initial determination that the data could 
not be sorted on-site.323  The court found it necessary to instruct that, in 
warrants for such a broad amount of data, there should be a protocol 
preventing agents engaged in the investigation from examining or retaining 
any data other than that for which there is probable cause.324
The majority then moved on to consider the Illston Quashal, finding that 
Judge Illston had not abused her discretion in quashing the subpoenas 
issued after the Cooper and Mahan Orders.
 
325
 
 315. Id. at 995–96. 
  It established that it is not 
per se unreasonable to seek both a subpoena and a warrant for the same 
 316. Id. at 997. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 998. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 999; see also supra Part II.B.3. 
 322. CDT II, 579 F.3d at 999. 
 323. Id. at 1000. 
 324. Id. at 999. 
 325. Id. at 1003–04. 
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investigation.326  Yet, when applying for any sort of investigatory tools, law 
enforcement must make clear to any judicial officer any prior attempts to 
obtain such information in other fora.327
Upon conclusion of the consideration of the appeals of the case, the court 
outlined the reasoning behind its findings and discussed the underlying 
constitutional issues presented by digital searches.  It found that digital 
searches pose a fundamental Fourth Amendment issue that was not easily 
resolved by analogy to previous jurisprudence:  “Th[e] pressing need of law 
enforcement for broad authorization to examine electronic records . . . 
creates a serious risk that every warrant for electronic information will 
become, in effect, a general warrant, rendering the Fourth Amendment 
irrelevant.”
 
328
1. Magistrates should insist that the government waive reliance upon the 
plain view doctrine in digital evidence cases. 
  Because authorization to search some computer files 
“automatically” becomes a license to search all files within a given 
directory, hard drive, or other expansive collection, the court found it 
necessary to emphasize its holding by outlining procedures, adapted from 
its previous Tamura decision, to be followed by magistrates in digital 
search cases to avoid Fourth Amendment violations: 
2. Segregation and redaction must be either done by specialized personnel 
or an independent third party. If the segregation is to be done by 
government computer personnel, it must agree in the warrant application 
that the computer personnel will not disclose to the investigators any 
information other than that which is the target of the warrant. 
3. Warrants and subpoenas must disclose the actual risks of destruction of 
information as well as prior efforts to seize that information in other 
judicial fora. 
4. The government's search protocol must be designed to uncover only the 
information for which it has probable cause, and only that information 
may be examined by the case agents. 
5. The government must destroy or, if the recipient may lawfully possess 
it, return non-responsive data, keeping the issuing magistrate informed 
about when it has done so and what it has kept.329
The court concluded by emphasizing that we must “rely on the good sense 
and vigilance of our magistrate judges” to protect Fourth Amendment rights 
in this regard.
 
330  As opposed to the traditionalist approach,331
 
 326. Id. at 1003. 
 these 
prophylactic rules shift the focus from ex post review to the warrant 
application process to prevent general searches before they inevitably occur.  
The court found that the peculiar and difficult complications involved in 
 327. Id. at 1004. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 1006. 
 330. Id. at 1007. 
 331. See supra Part III.A. 
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computer searches necessitated a radically different approach to prevent 
Fourth Amendment violations. 
b.  The Reaction and the Revised Opinion (CDT III) 
The prophylactic rules created in CDT II met a considerable amount of 
resistance following their creation.  While some courts accepted these 
restrictions to certain degrees,332 courts considering the issue more often 
rejected these new rules, including the Williams and Mann decisions 
discussed above.333  A district court within the Ninth Circuit even 
distinguished CDT II on the basis that it involved a case where the court 
was primarily concerned with deliberate overreaching by the government 
and refused to find the directives contained therein to be binding.334
The executive’s response to the decision was immediate and highly 
critical.  Then-Solicitor General Elena Kagan filed a petition on November 
23, 2009 for a full en banc rehearing of all twenty-seven judges of the Ninth 
Circuit.
 
335  The government claimed that the en banc panel’s decision had 
an “immediate and detrimental effect on law enforcement . . . . [and] [i]n 
some districts, computer searches [had] ground to a complete halt.”336  
They posited that imposing these guidelines was beyond the scope of the 
present controversy, and that a better course for protecting Fourth 
Amendment rights would be to continue to allow courts to form rules piece 
by piece through the resolution of actual controversies.337  To further its 
point, the government also put forth a parade of horribles about how the 
“filter team” requirement was unworkable and would result in the 
destruction of critical evidence.338
Nine months later, while refusing to rehear the case, the Ninth Circuit 
responded to the petition and revised its previous opinion, deeming it the 
“final action of the court.”
 
339
 
 332. See, e.g., United States v. Seldon, 385 F. App’x 676, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2010); Chaim 
v. United States, 692 F. Supp. 2d 461, 469 (D.N.J. 2010); United States v. Farlow, No. CR-
09-38-B-W, 2009 WL 4728690, at *6 (D. Me. Dec. 3, 2009). 
  As revised, the court backed away from its 
previously far-reaching holding, and narrowed its implications 
considerably.  The previous 9-2 majority opinion was re-labeled “per 
curiam,” and the portions that the government found offensive, including 
the prophylactic rules, were moved into a concurrence joined by only five 
 333. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 784–85 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 524 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 334. United States v. King, 693 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1229 (D. Haw. 2010). 
 335. Brief for the United States in Support of Rehearing En Banc by the Full Court, 
United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Nos. 05-10067, 05-15006, 05-55354 (9th Cir. 
Nov. 23, 2009), available at https://ecf.ca9.uscourts.gov/cmecf/servlet/
TransportRoom?servlet=CaseSummary.jsp&caseNum=05-55354&incOrigDkt=Y&inc 
DktEntries=Y.  
 336. Id. at 1. 
 337. Id. at 1–8. 
 338. Id. at 15–18. 
 339. CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1165 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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judges.340  The language about guiding magistrate judges was moved to this 
concurrence,341 and strong wording about the “illogical result” of allowing 
practical concerns to justify an overbroad warrant that allows whatever 
investigators choose to seize on a computer to come into plain view was 
completely removed.342
The previous mandates that the court provided to magistrate judges were 
now only “guidance”—a “safe harbor” of sorts—yet still designed to 
“protect[] the people’s right to privacy and property in their papers and 
effects.”
 
343  Thus, the binding guidance that emerged from the revised 
opinion was simply that the circumstances of computer searches “call[] for 
greater vigilance on the part of judicial officers in striking the right balance 
between the government's interest in law enforcement and the right of 
individuals to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”344  Despite 
this limited holding, the court retained much of its language explaining how 
the digital search context poses difficulties that will necessitate that a new 
“fair balance” be struck.345  The per curiam opinion still points to the 
prophylactic rules now listed in the concurrence, admonishing that “clear 
rules” benefit all parties’ interests.346  The spirit of the previous opinion 
remained in the revised version:  “The process of segregating electronic 
data that is seizable from that which is not must not become a vehicle for 
the government to gain access to data which it has no probable cause to 
collect.”347
IV.  A NEW REGIME FOR DIGITAL SEARCHES IS NECESSARY TO COUNTER 
THE DANGER POSED TO THE UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT 
 
The proliferation of the means and methods by which data is transmitted 
and stored has caused a strain on Fourth Amendment principles.  The 
Fourth Amendment’s reference to “papers” and “effects” is inapplicable in 
an environment where technology has significantly changed the way we 
live.  Many courts have set aside the original principles and motivations 
underlying the Fourth Amendment when evaluating the plain view doctrine 
as applied to digital searches.  Part III of this Note outlined the spectrum of 
opinion among the Courts of Appeals on this issue.  Courts are hesitant to 
fundamentally depart from previous Fourth Amendment principles and 
doctrines in digital searches.348
 
 340. Id. at 1178–80 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
  Judges are prone to “throw up their hands” 
when faced with the difficult obstacles presented to law enforcement and 
 341. Id. at 1180. 
 342. Compare CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 998 (9th Cir. 2009), with CDT III, 621 F.3d at 
1178–79. 
 343. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1178. 
 344. Id. at 1177. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. See, e.g., supra note 328 and accompanying text. 
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permit a loosening of Fourth Amendment standards.349  The motivations 
that prompted resistance to general warrants prior to the Fourth 
Amendment’s drafting350 should compel courts today to resist the current 
government’s demand for wide discretion.  Rather than sacrificing the 
original spirit of the Fourth Amendment by allowing digital searches to be 
conducted with such wide discretion, the judiciary should follow its “long 
and celebrated tradition” of “generalizing from those specific practices [that 
motivated the Fourth Amendment’s drafting] to . . . broader evils,” and find 
that changed circumstances in digital searches require a new set of rules.351
Natural rights involving privacy and freedom from unreasonable and 
arbitrary government action are inherent in the foundations of Anglo-
American society.
 
352  The Fourth Amendment is the only procedural 
safeguard to derive directly from the events that preceded the American 
Revolution353—the abusive practices and unfettered discretion enjoyed by 
the government under the general warrants and writs of assistance in both 
England and the colonies.354  This history continues to animate Fourth 
Amendment decisions,355 and the Supreme Court has several times 
emphasized that “the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to extend a 
general exploratory search from one object to another until something 
incriminating at last emerges.”356  This direction and attention to the spirit 
of the Fourth Amendment should guide courts in creating a new set of rules 
to govern cases involving digital evidence where general searches are 
unavoidable.357
As discussed below, a traditional application of the plain view exception 
in computer searches cannot be reconciled with the inherent problems that 
are present in the execution of warrants for digital data.  A new scheme is 
needed and the previously binding prophylactic factors laid out in CDT II 
deserve attention as the approach that most protects the original meaning 
and spirit of the Fourth Amendment.  Part IV.A discusses why the 
traditionalist approach is insufficient and why such a drastic change is both 
necessary and permissible.  Part IV.B proposes prophylactic measures very 
similar to those contained in CDT II, and discuss how each is necessary to 
prevent the exercise of unfettered discretion by the government when 
conducting digital searches. 
 
 
 349. Michael, supra note 20, at 926–27. 
 350. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
 351. See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1739, 1813 (2000); see also supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text. 
 352. NEWMAN, supra note 52, at 11. 
 353. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 1.1(a); see supra notes 37–52. 
 354. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 24, at 575–90; Maclin, supra note 28, at 218–29. 
 355. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31–32 (2001); Atwater v. City of Lago 
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 336–40 (2001); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 932–36 (1995). 
 356. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 
328 (1987); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971). 
 357. See supra notes 139–41, 319 and accompanying text. 
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A.  The Suitability and Necessity of a New Scheme for Digital Cases to 
Protect Against Unreasonable Dragnet Searches 
Recognition of the threat posed to Fourth Amendment rights by the 
inherent differences between physical and digital searches that allow for 
abusive dragnet searches should counsel the abandonment of the 
traditionalists’ straightforward ex post application of the Horton three-
prong test and the adoption of a new set of rules.  Part IV.A.1 discusses 
why this test is fundamentally flawed in digital searches, and how the 
warrant application process exacerbates the problem.  Part IV.A.2 discusses 
why the traditionalist approach fails.  Part IV.A.3 proffers that the 
imposition of prophylactic rules is both constitutionally permissible and 
important. 
1.  The Flawed Traditionalist Ex Post Review and Practices of Law 
Enforcement 
The Horton three-prong test is stretched beyond its bounds in ex post 
review of digital searches, and the practices of law enforcement do not 
comport with the plain view exception’s original justifications.  The first 
prong—that investigators are legally within the place where the 
incriminating objects can be seen—will always be present because warrants 
afford wide discretion to law enforcement officials to open files with 
innocuous labeling.358
The most serious issues arise when examining the third prong—whether 
the incriminating nature of the evidence was “immediately apparent.”
  This assumption also satisfies the second prong by 
granting investigators a lawful right to access the object. 
359  
The plain view exception grew out of the inherent practicality and 
reasonableness that an officer should not have to obtain an additional 
warrant for objects that would be seizable upon view in a public place 
without a warrant.360
Assuming that at least all file names on a computer are “in plain view,” 
viewing the contents of such files surely involves an inspection not 
considered by past precedent because of what officers have to do to open or 
view them.  Decoding and opening files involves a depth of investigation 
not permissible in physical searches.
  But the incredible amount of data that can be stored 
on digital devices and the broad authority granted to investigators removes 
any reasonableness in considering every file in a digital storage device to be 
“out in the open.” 
361
 
 358. See supra notes 
  The Supreme Court has 
commanded that the cursory inspection of innocuous paper documents must 
be a “truly cursory inspection—one that involves merely looking at what is 
139–41, 193–94, 210, 301–05 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 360. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25 (1987); see supra Part II.B.4. 
 361. Cf. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 326–27 (finding stolen property excludable on the basis that 
the investigating officer moved a stereo to view its serial numbers upon mere suspicion that 
it was stolen and it was thus not in “plain view”). 
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already exposed to view, without disturbing it.”362  Courts have found that 
deeper inspection removes the immediately incriminating nature of items 
claimed to be in plain view.363  In computer searches, investigators must 
take multiple steps to reveal what eventually may be deemed incriminating 
in files that are compressed, encrypted, deleted, or password protected.364
The procedures involved in the application and execution of digital 
search warrants exacerbate the problems present in ex post review.
  
These fundamental flaws in applying the three-prong test laid out in Horton 
should compel dispensing with this doctrine in the context of computer 
searches. 
365  
Another practical justification for the plain view exception—the 
inconvenience of obtaining a second warrant and the risks to officers or 
evidence366—does not apply to computer searches where large scale 
copying occurs and officers are afforded ample time to search.  
Furthermore, in applying for the initial warrants, form language is often 
employed in affidavits supporting an officer’s application.  This language 
cites general concerns about the volume of information and the possibility 
of camouflage to justify authorization to search all items.367  The warrants 
will rarely possess information that limits the search to particular 
circumstances of an individual investigation, such as limitations on the type 
of files sought (images, text, etc.), and do not specify why a blanket search 
of all files is necessary in any particular case.368
The government’s professed policy reflects this acceptance of form 
language.  The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has shifted away from 
Fourth Amendment concerns toward maximizing an investigator’s 
discretion.  Originally, the DOJ took the position that despite the difficulties 
involved in digital searches, “agents cannot simply establish probable 
cause, describe the files they need, and then ‘go’ and ‘retrieve’ the data.  
Instead, they must understand the technical limits of different search 
techniques [and] plan the search carefully.”
 
369  The first DOJ guide on 
searching and seizing computers contained concerns about limiting 
warrants to make sure they did not become too general and thereby 
unconstitutional,370
 
 362. Id. at 328. 
 with particular attention paid to the dangers posed to 
business records—advice that would have well suited the agents in 
 363. See, e.g., id. at 326–27 (holding that the moving of stereo equipment to view serial 
numbers to determine if it was stolen constituted a separate search such that the stereo could 
not have been immediately incriminating); People v. Rivas, 626 N.Y.S.2d 640, 641 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1995) (holding that when an officer had to piece together ripped sheets of paper to 
reveal the incriminating nature of an object, it could not have been seized in plain view). 
 364. Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 108, at 96. 
 365. See supra Part II.B.2–3. 
 366. Hicks, 480 U.S. at 327. 
 367. Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 108, at 70; see also supra notes 193, 219–21, 
246–49 and accompanying text. 
 368. Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 108, at 70–71. 
 369. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING 
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 29 (1st ed. 2001). 
 370. Id. at 42. 
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Comprehensive Drug Testing.371  This concern with limiting discretion 
waned over time, as the DOJ now directs its officers to “[a]void drafting 
warrants that would unnecessarily restrict the scope of the search.”372  
Officers on the ground have taken the advice and assume a wide range of 
discretion, continuing aggressively and “undaunted” in viewing any file 
they deem necessary to “confirm” any suspicions they may have.373  This is 
directly contradictory to the principle, established prior to the American 
Revolution, and essential to the Fourth Amendment and its jurisprudence :  
discretion should lie with the magistrate, and an officer should not be 
permitted to search wherever he sees fit.374  Practical difficulties in limiting 
digital searches does not mean that these searches should not be limited.375
2.  The Traditionalist Approach Seriously Threatens the Protection of 
Fourth Amendment Rights 
 
The balancing approach employed by many courts in the past century has 
generally led to a dilution of Fourth Amendment principles.376  Without 
close attention to the original principles underlying the Fourth Amendment, 
the governmental need to fight crime will almost always provide a 
compelling argument to outweigh the privacy of accused criminals.377
Courts have made little progress in forming a workable doctrine on how 
best to protect against the dangers computer searches and the strict 
application of the plain view doctrine pose to the founding principles 
underlying the Fourth Amendment.  The lax methods proposed by law 
enforcement and accepted by courts leave this vulnerable area of Fourth 
Amendment law open to interpretation and abuse.  The suggestion by some 
courts and scholars that the law of reasonableness develop incrementally 
may not work.
  
Allowing the doctrine to progress incrementally neither protects Fourth 
Amendment rights in the present nor guarantees a situation where Fourth 
Amendment rights are protected by a proper balance in the future. 
378  Courts today are grappling with the same exact question 
they faced over a decade ago.379
 
 371. Id. at 43–44. 
  So long as the technology to limit 
searches sufficiently is not present, the inherent problems with digital 
searches may only grow with enhanced encryption techniques, data mining, 
and more dynamic methods of data storage.  Yet, courts continue to ignore 
these fundamental problems by applying the plain view doctrine to digital 
searches in the same manner as physical searches. 
 372. DIGITAL EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 141, at 10. 
 373. See supra notes 220, 237, 258–60, 280–301 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra notes 33, 48–57, 68–71, 93–95 and accompanying text. 
 375. See Michael, supra note 20, at 919. 
 376. See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text. 
 377. See Michael, supra note 20, at 919. 
 378. But see United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010); Kerr, supra note 
145, at 1277–78. 
 379. Compare United States v. Stabile, 2011 633 F.3d 219, 239–40 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(examining whether the plain view doctrine applies to file headers and file contents), with 
United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999) (same). 
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The traditionalist approach of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits essentially 
permits any incriminating information found when searching each 
individual file on a given digital database to be used as evidence.380  The 
Third Circuit, while advocating incremental progress in the development of 
reasonableness guidelines, only further encourages vague rules and the lax 
attitude of law enforcement discussed below by leaving this question 
open.381  Over objections by appellants, traditionalist courts permit actions 
that they admittedly find troubling382 while contrarily counseling caution 
and respect for privacy.383  Setting aside the issue of inadvertency, while 
doctrinally correct, ignores the fundamental incongruity of the officers’ 
actions in these cases when considering the Framers’ intention to end such 
abusive practices.  Attention to this intent would categorically deny 
allowing officers to “confirm” mere suspicion of crimes outside the scope 
of the warrant.384
As is evident from the sample cases outlined in Part III, courts are much 
less willing to bend old doctrines where the underlying crimes are more 
socially objectionable.
 
385  While “understandable abhorrence of [child 
pornography] can infect judicial judgment. . . . the Fourth Amendment 
do[es] not depend on the nature of the suspected criminal activity, any more 
than . . . on the race or gender of the suspect.”386  It ignores the animating 
principle of the Fourth Amendment to apply its direction selectively—the 
right to be free from arbitrary police discretion must be constantly afforded 
to all individuals.387  The focus should not be on the harm done to the 
defendant by allowing evidence to be admitted, but to the harm to society 
created by an erosion of Fourth Amendment rights, “particularly . . . where 
the issue is the searching of personal computers, on which more and more 
extremely sensitive information is stored.”388
The traditionalist approach permits officers to conduct dragnet searches, 
which the Framers aimed to prevent.  In every case, the officers, either 
admittedly or by implication, were clearly rummaging for evidence not 
specifically listed in the warrant.
 
389
 
 380. See supra notes 
  In Comprehensive Drug Testing, the 
investigating officers attempted to seek the broadest warrant and subpoenas 
possible and continuously sought broader authorization after having already 
been limited by magistrate judges.  Beyond this, they “completely ignored” 
203–04, 219–20 and accompanying text. 
 381. See Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 238 (2011). 
 382. See Mann, 592 F.3d at 786. 
 383. See United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 523–24 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 384. See Stabile, 633 F.3d at 242.  
 385. Compare Mann, 592 F.3d at 780–81 (defendant videotaped female locker room and 
found in possession of child pornography), and Williams, 592 F.3d at 514–16 (defendant 
threatened schoolchildren with sexual assault and found in possession of child pornography), 
with CDT II, 579 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2009) (involving medical records of individuals not 
being charged with a crime). 
 386. United States v. Krupa, 633 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2011) (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 387. But see Moshirnia, supra note 123, at 626–35 (advocating a “crime-based” approach 
for when the plain view doctrine should or should not apply in digital searches). 
 388. Krupa, 633 F.3d 1148, at 1157 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 389. See supra notes 197, 213, 224–31, 251–53, 272–93 and accompanying text. 
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the terms of the warrants they received.390  The lower court judges in these 
cases expressed their shock at the tactics of the officers to seize data for 
which they did not have probable cause, asking, “[W]hat ever happened to 
the Fourth Amendment? Was it . . . repealed somehow?”391
Officers cannot be afforded the opportunity to plead sufficient facts to 
establish probable cause for a relatively minor crime, or against nominal 
individuals, in the hopes that they will uncover evidence they suspect to be 
on the same computer database involving different crimes or other 
defendants.
 
392  As seen by the Ninth Circuit, the traditional mode of 
analysis can be particularly unpalatable when dealing with private business 
or medical records compared with child pornographers, counterfeiters, and 
drug dealers.  Indeed the business community, spurred by increasingly 
aggressive investigatory tactics by federal agents, is gravely concerned 
about the “potentially broad reach of the plain view doctrine as applied to 
searches of computers.”393  They suggest business actors fight back against 
overreaching officers, through such means as constant supervision of 
investigators by corporate counsel and instructing employees to take care to 
not answer any intrusive questions posed by law enforcement besides 
legitimate ones aimed at identifying seizable material.394
The actions and attitudes expressed by officers in these sample cases may 
even have satisfied the Tenth Circuit’s original “subjective” analysis.  
However, the incredibly fact-sensitive nature of such subjective analysis is 
unworkable as a doctrine for all cases.
  The potential for 
dragnet searches of businesses’ digital records is immense and troubling 
considering the hostile attitudes and distrust toward large companies in the 
wake of the financial crisis.  Allegations of minor accounting irregularities 
by low level employees could be used as pretext for officers to search any 
file they want for evidence of crimes for which no probable cause has been 
established.  While it may be practical to allow for broad authorization to 
seize and search electronic data, the potential for abuse created by such 
lenient standards will lead to overreaching by law enforcement. 
395  While the Tenth Circuit 
recognized this and held that its cases more generally raised the 
particularity standard in digital warrants, it failed to require sufficient 
restrictions, impose search limitations in every case, or take further steps to 
make sure such limitations are followed.396
The Ninth Circuit’s original en banc decision—which imposed a new set 
of mandatory guidelines—was much more responsive to the perils posed by 
traditionalist interpretation.  All of these measures are necessary to ensure 
 
 
 390. See supra note 315 and accompanying text; see also CDT III, 621 F.3d 1162, 1177 
(9th Cir. 2010). 
 391. CDT III, 621 F.3d at 1177. 
 392. See supra note 93. 
 393. William F. Johnson, Steven M. Witzel, & Lisa H. Bebchick, Expect the Unexpected:  
Prepare in Advance for a Search Warrant on Business Premises, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 24,  2011, 
at 2. 
 394. Id. 
 395. See supra notes 271–72 and accompanying text. 
 396. See supra notes 273–79 and accompanying text. 
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compliance with the Fourth Amendment’s call for particularity and its 
underlying purpose of curbing governmental discretion:  a change in the 
way we view the plain view doctrine in digital cases; particularized 
warrants with specific justifications and search methodologies; and 
sufficient distance between a “zealous officer[] . . . engaged in the often 
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”397 and the temptation of mass 
amounts of potentially incriminating information.398
3.  Ex Ante Limitations Are Neither Constitutionally Impermissible Nor 
Improper 
  Despite the court’s 
retreat in its revised opinion, officers and courts should view these as best 
practices to be employed in all cases. 
The imposition of prophylactic rules is necessary, and should not be 
found to be constitutionally impermissible399 nor as unprecedented and far-
reaching as the government contends.400  The cases presented by Professor 
Orin Kerr that could arguably indicate a limited role for magistrate judges 
are unique and limited in scope, and do not address search protocols that 
may govern the proper limits of a digital search within the boundaries of the 
Fourth Amendment.401  In Lo-Ji Sales,402 magistrate-imposed restrictions 
did not make the method impermissible it was that the magistrate could not 
be neutral and detached where he participated in the search.403  While the 
Court in Dalia404 found magistrate guidance on how a wiretap is to be 
installed unnecessary, it is not analogous to conditions on how a computer 
search should be executed.  Limiting how the wiretap would be installed 
would not protect any recognizable Fourth Amendment interests like a 
search protocol or other prophylactic protections that effectively narrow a 
search would.  The Court in Dalia mentions that nothing in the Fourth 
Amendment says a warrant “must” include an outline on how it will be 
executed,405
All these cases seem to stand for the proposition that only certain 
requirements are necessary to satisfy particularity, and that extensive 
restrictions are unnecessary.  But, these requirements that the defendants in 
these cases petitioned for did not address the particularity as to the place to 
be searched and things to be seized.  Limiting how a computer may be 
searched is in fact limiting the “place to be searched” and “the things to be 
seized.”  The restriction of computer searches is within the constitutional 
 yet this is far from foreclosing that possibility where it is 
necessary to protect against what otherwise inevitably becomes a general 
search. 
 
 397. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948). 
 398. See infra Part IV.B. 
 399. See supra notes 150–59 and accompanying text. 
 400. See supra notes 336–38 and accompanying text. 
 401. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
 402. Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979). 
 403. Id. at 326–27. 
 404. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979). 
 405. Id. at 257. 
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powers of magistrate judges to narrow the warrant sufficiently such that it is 
not converted into a general one.  The American Law Institute has 
contemplated a continuing oversight role for magistrate judges for the past 
thirty years,406 and courts have done so since the seminal cases that led to 
the Fourth Amendment.407  Search protocols can be very useful in many 
situations,408 and the intrusive nature of computer searches may make 
limiting search protocols and other magistrate-imposed restrictions almost a 
necessity.409
Ex ante protocols should not be understood as a departure from what is 
already required in any warrant.  Warrants must state with particularity the 
places to be searched and the things to be seized.  However, in the case of 
computer searches, describing the “place to be searched” as an entire 
directory, hard drive, or other digital storage medium with an incredible 
amount of information does not sufficiently limit a search as a warrant for 
an entire home would.  Removed are the physical constraints that limit the 
searches of those spaces, and added is the plethora of information and 
records simply not present in the physical context.
 
410  In Andresen v. 
Maryland,411 the Supreme Court found that, even in the much less invasive 
case of intermingled hard copy documents, “judicial officials[] must take 
care to assure that [searches] are conducted in a manner that minimizes 
unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.”412
Magistrate judges have imposed limitations on how warrants may be 
executed, finding it within their constitutional mandate to do so.  At least 
one judge has found that they are part of the particularity requirement, 
merely ensuring the search will be narrow.
 
413  Such limitations are not as 
unprecedented as the government’s rehearing brief in Comprehensive Drug 
Testing suggests;414 in fact, the Ninth Circuit simply affirmed the 
magistrates’ already restrictive limitations placed on the warrants that the 
officers ignored.415  When there is a considerable worry about sufficient 
particularity—as is nearly always present in computer search warrants—it 
is “constitutionally required to address those issues [at the warrant stage] in 
a way that avoids the later suppression of evidence.”416
 
 406. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, 
§ 220.5 (1975) (advocating for the continued involvement of magistrate judges to determine 
what procedures should be followed in segregating relevant evidence from innocuous 
materials). 
  A magistrate judge 
may condition the seizure of all digital storage devices belonging to a 
 407. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 408. United States v. Cartier, 543 F.3d 442, 447–48 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 409. United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 410. See supra Part II.A. 
 411. 427 U.S. 463 (1976). 
 412. Id. at 482 n.11. 
 413. In re Search of:  3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (N.D. Ill. 2004). 
 414. See Brief for the United States, supra note 335; supra notes 281, 335–38 and 
accompanying text. 
 415. See supra notes 293–94 and accompanying text. 
 416. In re Search of:  3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d at 956, 962. 
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certain person on the later submittal of a search protocol.417  Prophylactic 
rules encourage “scrupulous adherence” to the particularity requirement that 
the Supreme Court found to be important in preventing general searches.418  
Understanding “unreasonable” as the Framers did should lead to the 
conclusion that warrants that are not sufficiently limited with particularity 
violate fundamental legal principles and thus are per se unreasonable.419
B.  Ex Ante Restrictions to Protect Fourth Amendment Rights in Searches of 
Digital Data 
 
The potential for abuse discussed above is best addressed by the Ninth 
Circuit’s original en banc decision in CDT II.  This decision provided a new 
scheme to replace the traditional application of the plain view exception and 
change the way computers are searched to protect Fourth Amendment 
interests.  These rules should guide the judiciary and law enforcement in the 
future investigation of cases involving digital evidence.  This section 
discusses the rules that are most essential to Fourth Amendment interests in 
digital search cases. 
1.  Applications for Computer Warrants Should Contain Case-Specific 
Justifications for the Method of Search and Segregation 
Allowing for basic concerns common to all computer searches to justify 
increased intrusion in the form of seizure, copying, and off-site search 
limited only by continuously renewable deadlines is not a sufficient means 
to ensure that officers act within the constraints of the Fourth 
Amendment.420  On-site search should be the default assumption, with an 
additional warrant attainable if it is not reasonable or possible to postulate 
initially as to the necessity of other methods.421  Magistrate judges should 
also maintain control over the process by which evidence is returned to its 
owners, and ensure that all non-relevant equipment, information, or files 
that are seized (or copied) are returned as quickly as possible.422
2.  The Plain View Exception Should Apply Only to Evidence Reasonably 
Related to the Evidence Sought in the Warrant 
 
The Seventh Circuit stated that it would be “drastic” to abandon the plain 
view doctrine entirely in digital searches.423  The Ninth Circuit found that 
officers should “waive reliance” on the doctrine altogether.424
 
 417. Id. 
  It may be 
correct that the full release of the doctrine in digital cases overcompensates 
 418. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (describing the discussion in Horton of 
the particularity requirement and its ability to prevent Fourth Amendment abuses). 
 419. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
 420. See supra notes 367–72 and accompanying text. 
 421. Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 108, at 102. 
 422. Id. at 103–04. 
 423. United States v. Mann, 592 F.3d 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2010). 
 424. See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
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for the relative danger to Fourth Amendment rights.  The type of evidence 
subject to plain view could be more appropriately limited to include what 
would otherwise be uncovered in an appropriately limited search in the 
physical context.  For example, in the Mann case, it would not be practical 
to limit the search merely to evidence of voyeurism of young girls to the 
exclusion of any child pornography or erotica found on the defendant’s hard 
drive.425  They involve the same types of files, the same defendant, and 
substantially the same type of crime.  Furthermore, it would be nonsensical 
to exclude evidence of multiple crimes contained in a single file where that 
evidence still concerns individuals under investigation; if a single file 
contained evidence of multiple crimes, there is no reasonable expectation of 
privacy to justify ignoring the evidence that is not specified in the 
warrant.426  It is not necessary to abandon what was a practical doctrine.  
However, it should be severely limited to the situations just discussed—
involving the same files, types of crimes, or defendants—because of the 
inherent differences that make strict application of the plain view doctrine 
inappropriate.427
3.  Digital Warrants Should Contain a Search Protocol Designed to Uncover 
Only That Evidence Authorized To Be Seized in the Warrant 
 
Limiting any on-site or off-site search by an appropriate search protocol 
is one of the most important measures to ensure that computer warrants are 
not converted into general warrants.  However, the use of automated search 
techniques is more effective in the investigation of certain crimes against 
certain individuals or entities.  While investigations of large organizations 
pose substantial difficulties because of the large number of computers, 
storage media, and shared directories that may need to be searched, such 
searches are mostly text-based, as they involve locating records of white-
collar crime or large-scale drug organizations.428
Other means of limitation can be accomplished by the use of forensic 
software such as “EnCase,” and “hashes” as discussed previously.
  Such files are easier to 
search than audio or video content because they are much more susceptible 
to keyword searches.  Especially in cases where files are less likely to be 
surreptitiously labeled, as in many cases with illicit items like drug records 
or child pornography, keyword searches can provide sufficient limitations.  
Yet most searches will need to be limited further by other means. 
429  Well-
planned use of these techniques has the potential to limit the search to 
relevant data by the least intrusive means possible; however, this process 
could turn up a number of false positives.430
 
 425. See supra notes 206–11 and accompanying text. 
  This can be further limited by 
manually isolating the search to those files created or modified in certain 
 426. Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 108, at 105. 
 427. See supra Part IV.A.1–2. 
 428. See Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 108, at 99 & n.180. 
 429. See supra notes 169–73 and accompanying text. 
 430. Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 108, at 61. 
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date ranges, controlled by certain individuals, or of certain file types.431  
These techniques for manually isolating files can also be helpful in the 
execution of searches, not only for text, but also for audio, images, and 
videos.432  Hashes contained in FTK software, such as that used in 
Mann,433
Ex ante restrictions of search techniques and protocols do not necessarily 
have to predict the exact circumstances of the pending search.  They can 
provide flexible guidance, such as predicating the opening of certain files 
upon certain conditions like probable cause being met.  Magistrate judges 
are not without experience in determining what would be an appropriate 
search beforehand, even without information about the specific files to be 
found.  Many of the same issues of probable cause, particularity, and 
reasonableness recur in all computer searches, as is evidenced by the form 
language used by officers in applying for such warrants.
 should be used when investigating crimes related to those for 
which the DOJ possesses “flagged” files. 
434  Furthermore, if 
the protocols are found to be too restrictive based upon the situation 
presented when a special master reviews the materials as discussed below, 
an investigator can apply for a new warrant and testify to the reasonableness 
of his proposed actions.435
Limiting searches by such protocols is not comprehensive and often 
requires the second step of a physical search to find relevant information.
  This likely would not lead to unreasonable 
delay or inconvenience. 
436  
The automated searches are based on strings of text-based characters 
contained in the files, and often miss relevant data.437  Depending on the 
software used, automated searches also fail to reach files that have been 
compressed, encrypted, or deleted, and thus require recovery.438  The 
search techniques for other types of files are likely limited to searching the 
format alone, not the content of such files.439
 
 431. Id. at 97, 100. 
  Thus, while limiting the 
intrusiveness of a computer search necessarily involves trying to limit its 
scope, there likely will need to be additional rummaging to even find the 
relevant information for the prosecution of the crime contained in the 
warrant.  Thus, to protect against such discretion being afforded to the 
government, the next limitation is perhaps the most important to prevent 
Fourth Amendment violations in the computer search context. 
 432. See id. at 97. 
 433. See supra notes 213–15 and accompanying text. 
 434. See supra notes 193, 219–21, 246–49, 444 and accompanying text. 
 435. See In re Search of:  3817 W. West End, 321 F. Supp. 2d 953, 961–62 (N.D. Ill. 
2004) (discussing methods officers may follow when search protocol is too restrictive). 
 436. See supra notes 169–76 and accompanying text. 
 437. Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 108, at 61–62. 
 438. Id. at 62. 
 439. Id. 
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4.  Segregation of Data Should Be Performed By a Court-Appointed 
Special Master 
The magistrate overseeing a warrant for computer searches should insist 
upon the appointment of a “special master” to conduct the search in a way 
that follows the protocols included in the warrant.440  The magistrates in 
CDT imposed such a restriction, but the investigators ignored the 
requirement.441
Courts have long recognized the constitutional value of having such 
neutral third parties, experts in a given field, segregate data where the 
specter of a general search looms.
  Delegating the authority to manually search individual files 
to a special master will prevent the impermissible grant of broad 
authorization to the government that allows it to conduct dragnet searches.  
Special masters should be neutral third parties, or if proper procedures can 
be developed to ensure independence they may also be officers specially 
trained in computer forensics not assigned to the case under question.  
Special masters should receive all seized or otherwise copied files before 
they are reviewed by anybody else.  They can then use the techniques 
described above to segregate data that is within the scope of the warrant, 
while excluding non-relevant evidence unless it closely relates to the crime 
specified in the warrant or is contained in the same file as evidence that the 
warrant authorizes to be seized. 
442  Appointing a special master assures 
that any authority to view files potentially outside the scope of the warrant 
is granted to an official unconnected to the investigation and uninterested in 
“extend[ing] a general exploratory search from one object to another until 
something incriminating at last emerges.”443  This may be the only way to 
avoid the “advertent or inadvertent exploitation of the plain view doctrine 
when officers must search large quantities of computer files.”444
CONCLUSION 
 
Reasonableness should not turn on a necessary function of police power; 
to the Framers, unreasonable simply meant that which violates fundamental 
legal norms.445
 
 440. See id. at 105. 
  The fundamental legal norms that underlie the Fourth 
Amendment lead to the conclusion that “the people” should not be subject 
to unreasonable searches and seizures until courts finally determine what is 
reasonable and unreasonable.  The principles of the Framers cannot be 
 441. See supra notes 305–09, 315 and accompanying text. 
 442. United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1353 (11th Cir. 1982) (praising similar 
procedures as “an attempt by the ‘responsible officials . . . to assure that [the search is] 
conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy’” (quoting 
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 482 n. 11 (1976))); Forro Precision, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 
673 F.2d 1045, 1053–54 (9th Cir. 1982) (approving of and advocating the use of lay experts 
to segregate documents with complex subject matter on-site). 
 443. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971); see supra note 13 and 
accompanying text. 
 444. Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 108, at 105. 
 445. See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text. 
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abandoned because a sudden technological change cannot be reconciled 
with past, incrementally-built doctrines.  The Supreme Court has aptly 
applied these founding principles to new technologies in the past,446 and 
taken a proactive stance in preventing the grant of licenses to the 
government to conduct fishing expeditions.447
The exclusionary rule, created well after the Fourth Amendment, does 
not protect the trampling of rights that occur from the unconstitutional 
rummaging that occurs in almost every digital search.  Ex ante restrictions 
protect Fourth Amendment rights of persons threatened with an intrusive 
search that involves general rummaging through their entire lives as 
catalogued in computer data, records, and files.  The people are not free 
from unreasonable searches and seizures if we allow those searches in all 
cases to be subject only to lenient ex post review.  Ex ante restrictions will 
protect individuals never charged with crimes—who would otherwise 
receive no benefit from ex post review—from having their files subjected to 
general searches.
 
448  Officers should be “acting within [the] constraints 
established by the Fourth Amendment,” not simply subject to reprimand 
after they have acted without regard for its underlying principles.449
If a man’s home is truly to remain his castle and officers continue to be 
required to work within the constraints of the Fourth Amendment, a man’s 
computer must be treated as his castle as well.  The abuses that led to the 
drafting of the Fourth Amendment have not been abated, they have merely 
been transformed.
 
450
 
  General warrants exist today through the strict 
application of the plain view doctrine to digital searches.  It is of the utmost 
importance that the principles underlying the Fourth Amendment are 
considered, and officers are restricted from conducting unreasonable digital 
searches through the use of ex ante restrictions. 
 
 446. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
 447. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 448. Brenner & Frederiksen, supra note 108, at 100. 
 449. Id. 
 450. Michael, supra note 20, at 931. 
